

MILITARY AFFAIRS

VOLUME XXI



NUMBER 4

WINTER

1957*

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Publication Date, February 1958

Published by the American Military Institute

DEVOTED TO AMERICAN MILITARY (INCLUDING NAVAL AND AIR) HISTORY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Annual Subscription \$5.00

\$1.25 per Copy



MILITARY AFFAIRS is published quarterly by the American Military Institute. One copy of each issue is supplied to members. Annual subscription to nonmembers is \$5.00. The price of single issues of the current volume and of back issues except Volume I, Numbers 1 and 2, is \$1.25. Issues will be furnished on request. Correspondence regarding subscriptions, editorial contributions, membership, books for review, etc., should be addressed to the American Military Institute, 511 - 11th St., N. W., Washington 4, D. C. Entered as second-class matter at the postoffice at Baltimore, Md., under the Act of August 24, 1912.

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THE SOVIET IMAGE OF THE ENEMY

BY RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF*

THE Soviet image of American military views and strategy is an essential component of the over-all Soviet picture of future war. Evaluations of the enemy's military plans and capabilities necessarily affect one's own strategic thinking. In many respects the problem may appear to us not to be difficult for the Soviet leaders: Views, doctrine, and even general strategic plans are widely propagated and debated in Congressional hearings and the press in this country. But the very proliferation of sometimes conflicting statements by various American writers, official and unofficial, creates other difficulties for the Soviet analyst. In addition, Soviet ideological presuppositions influence their estimation of various points. Most important in Soviet calculations are the hard results of American military policy—force allocations, budgetary allotments, deployment of forces, and the development and procurement of weapons. Because the conclusions drawn from this realistic approach are seen as consistent with their ideological expectations, certain Soviet conclusions which otherwise might be dismissed as propaganda must be given credence. Also, the image of American strategy which is presented in restricted circulation organs is very nearly the same as

that which appears in the general military press. Finally, while views are distorted and motives are maligned, the Soviet picture is nonetheless a recognizable reflection of real American military thinking.

EVALUATION OF THE U.S. MILITARY STRUCTURE

Soviet military writers have concluded that the United States is building a military force structure with two main characteristics: (1) a major reliance on air-atomic striking power, but (2) maintenance of modern ground, sea, and air forces to complement the strategic air force. In addition, military alliances with various countries around the world are understood to be, in part, a complement to these American military forces, to provide both bases and mass ground armies. A number of aspects of these general Soviet conclusions deserve attention.

Soviet analysis is faced with the problem of reconciling their own belief in the basic rationality of the "imperialist militarists," with other views they hold ascribing predilections for reliance on "miracle" weapons—currently air-missile-atomic power—predilections which are, in terms of Soviet beliefs, "irrational." However, the Communist dialectic explains such contradictions within the imperialist strategy by means we shall note below.

The Soviets ascribe to the imperialists, and in particular to the United States, a proclivity to rely upon one-weapon strategies, particularly nuclear-thermonuclear air- and mis-

*Dr. Garthoff, who has contributed to this journal before (see "Soviet Attitudes toward Modern Air Power," XIX [Summer 1955], 76-80), as well as to other periodicals, is the author of *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1953); and of *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age*, which is scheduled for publication in the near future by Frederick A. Praeger of New York. His present article is a forerunner of his forthcoming volume.

sile-delivered weapons, and to bank upon the advantages of surprise attack. To note but one statement, Major General Khlopov has envisaged an American war plan, in the General Staff organ *Military Thought*, as follows:

Atomic bombs . . . will be employed by air forces in surprise attacks on important economic and political centers in the near and distant rear of the enemy with the aim of undermining his economic might and the morale stability of the population, and also, against large concentrations of troops and military matériel in the rear.¹

Many other statements, earlier and subsequently, have advanced this picture. Since early 1955, surprise has been particularly stressed: "At the basis of the 'preventive war' lies the expectation of the most complete exploitation of the results of a powerful surprise blow, especially by the air force employing means of mass destruction [i.e., nuclear weapons]," which would be aimed at "the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, in order to undermine the economic and morale might of the USSR and peoples' democracies. . . ."² The most extensive discussion of alleged American and British intention to wage war by a surprise attack was contained in the key article by Marshal of the Tank Troops Rotmistrov in *Military Thought* in February, 1955. In this article, he commented: "Surprise attack is a favorite means of the aggressor for unleashing war and proceeds from the very nature of the imperialist states." And more precisely, he stated:

The military figures of the United States and Britain openly declare that they intend to open war against us by means of surprise strategic blows with atomic and hydrogen weapons on the vitally important targets deep in the rear of the countries of the camp of

peace and democracy, calculating in a few days to knock out the basic industrial targets, to paralyze transport, to demoralize the population. The American-British strategists suppose that, utilizing the enormous destructive power of atomic and hydrogen weapons, they can defeat the enemy as the result of an initial strike, and seize the initiative in the war.³

Rotmistrov considered that the imperialists "correctly value surprise as a strong element in the military art" but, reflecting the Soviet view, he regards the degree of reliance on surprise as fallacious and adventuristic. Thus, the Western imperialists today "despite the crushing defeat of Fascist Germany" following the German use of surprise attack, "also place their stakes on a surprise attack, only under new conditions." The reason for the Western excessive stress on surprise is that "the imperialists are afraid of waging a long war because of political and economic considerations."⁴

This view of American strategy is noted here only as background to the question of Soviet evaluations of the American military-force structure. As is clearly implied, the Soviets tend to attribute to the United States primary reliance on the capabilities of the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

In the current military structure:

The magnates of Wall Street, preparing a new world war, place their stakes on the employment of the atomic bomb. In this, a special role is given to air power. On it are placed great hopes as the weapon with which the American imperialists dream of accomplishing their delirious plans for world conquest. . . . The relative weight assigned to their [the air force's] needs increases from year to year. . . .⁵

Other writers also describe American reliance upon the development of the air forces, and

¹Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaya mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 82.

²Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaya zvezda*, March 26, 1955; V. P. Skopin, *Militarizm*, 1956, p. 430; and Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaya mysl'*, No. 1, January 1954, pp. 77, 82.

³Marshal of Tank Troops P. Rotmistrov, *Voennaya mysl'*, No. 2, February, 1955, p. 19.

⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 19, 20.

⁵Col. A. Bozhenko, "The U. S. Air Force—A Tool of Aggression and Piracy," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 86.

ate that the United States "places its stakes in aviation."⁶

Within the air forces, and in general within the military structure, according to the Soviets, "the major place in the plans of the aggressive circles of the USA is given to the air forces, especially the strategic air force, which has become the dominating factor in the military strategy of the USA."⁷ This conclusion on the role of air power in American strategy is based not only on statements of American military leaders, but also on our budgetary allocations.⁸ Both the increased expenditures for air power, exceeding those for the Army or Navy, and the increasing proportion of military personnel in the USAF, are seen as indices of increasing reliance upon the air forces in the "New Look" budgets of the period since 1953. In the decade 1946 to 1956, the relative weight of the

air forces in the armed forces structure is said to have doubled.⁹

The pre-eminent role of the air forces leads the Soviets to conclude that this is the arm "for the select"—in the sense of political reliability.¹⁰ And more specifically, the key role of SAC crews is recognized—although with an ideological twist alleging particular "dedication to the imperialists." The Soviets say "considerable attention is devoted to the preparation of the crews of strategic bombers. Many important USAF leaders consider that the strategic aviation aircraft, and especially the atomic bomb carrier, must be flown by a crew consisting of the men most dedicated to the imperialists, capable of dealing treacherous surprise blows on vitally important enemy targets in the deep rear."¹¹

Particular reference has been made to General Curtis LeMay, while he served as Commander of the Strategic Air Command. He is sometimes identified in terms claiming that he "feverishly prepares for war, and atomic war at that."¹² A speech by General LeMay was printed in the June, 1955, issue of the official *Herald of the Air Fleet*. The brief introduction noted that strategic aviation, "the imperialists are convinced, is the decisive weapon in war," and, further, "LeMay obviously exaggerates the condition and combat potentialities of U.S. strategic air power."¹³

The Soviet evaluation of the United States Air Force as the main element of the American military forces is, as we have seen, based upon concrete data: expressions of doctrine,

⁶See B. Borisov, "The Air Forces of the USA," *Syl'ia rodiny*, No. 10, October, 1956, p. 22; Eng. Maj. Lidin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 3, March, 1955, p. 88; Col. A. Kononenko, "Conceptions of Military Circles in the USA," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 67; Eng. Lt. Col. B. Surikov, "The Development of Air Defense," *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 1, 1957; V. Linetsky, *Sovetskii flot*, February 14, 1957; Lt. Gen. of Aviation P. Braiko, "Soviet Aviation in the Second World War," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 19; Col. N. Kramarenko, "In Search for the 'Decisive Forces' for Aggression," *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956; Col. S. Kozlov, "Man and Technology in Contemporary War," *Sovetskii flot*, January 5, 1957; and Chief Marshal of Aviation P. Zhigarev, "The Air Fleet of the Soviet Power," *Pravda*, July 3, 1955.

⁷Eng. Lt. Col. P. Safonov, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 9, September, 1954, p. 79; and see esp. Col. A. Bozhenko, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 87, 90.

⁸See Lt. Gen. of Av. N. Zhuravlev, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, April 25, 1957; Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mys'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 81; M. Kremencev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 10, 1954; Lt. Gen. A. Sukhomlin, *News*, No. 12, June, 1954, p. 10; Col. N. Rodin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 71; Col. A. Bozhenko, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 86; Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; Col. M. Mil'shtein, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 25, 1955; Lt. Gen. of Aviation, P. Braiko, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 19; N. Glagolev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 20, 1956; and Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 67.

⁹Col. B. Karpovich, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 78.

¹⁰Col. A. Bozhenko and Col. V. Osipov, "Who Commands the American Air Forces?" *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1951, p. 90.

¹¹Eng. Lt. Col. P. Safonov and Eng. Lt. Col. T. Andreev, "Preparation of the Crew of a Strategic Bomber (According to the Foreign Press)," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 7, 1955, p. 91.

¹²Col. A. Bozhenko, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 88.

¹³"On the U.S. Strategic Air Command," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 6, June, 1955, pp. 91-94; introductory statement on p. 91.

and relative budgetary allotments. The Soviet expressed *explanation* of the presumed reasoning behind this American emphasis on air power is based upon three factors: (1) a fallacy in bourgeois military science, (2) an error in calculation of weapons potentialities, and, most important, (3) an awareness of a fundamental weakness in mass morale.

The alleged fallacy in bourgeois military science is the view that "chance" factors, rather than the permanently-operating factors, can decide war.¹⁴ Moreover, "bourgeois military ideologists," it is said, "attempt to compensate for the weakness of the economic and morale potential of their countries by adventurous military theories and strategic plans."¹⁵ The error in weapons potentialities concerns both the general bourgeois vulnerability for the predilection to seek easy solutions through over-reliance on one-weapon strategies, and in particular an exaggeration of the role of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons.¹⁶ But basic to these errors, and combined with them, is the last alleged factor: the necessity for reliance on substitutes for the true winning weapons system, a large modern combined arms force, because of a fundamental *morale* weakness inherent in the class nature of bourgeois society.

Marshal of Aviation Vershinin voiced this explanation several years ago in the following passage:

The underestimation of the infantry reflects the fear of the imperialist bourgeoisie of their peoples, of mass armies. . . . Not having reliable reserves of manpower at their disposal. . . . These ideas emanate from the completely distorted view that the outcome of war can be decided by some one kind of

weapons alone. History has proved the reverse more than once.¹⁷

This particular statement was made in the Stalinist period, but it is typical of many others which continue in the post-Stalinist and thermonuclear-weapons era.¹⁸ One writer has declared that imperialist military theoreticians "have begun to propagate the idea of the withering away of existing arms (infantry, artillery) and to place their stakes on atomic, chemical and bacteriological weapons."¹⁹ And, with an explicitness which is rare, another Soviet military writer stated (in 1953) that as a consequence of reliance upon nuclear air power, "the ground forces to this time continue to remain the weakest and most vulnerable point in the composition of the American armed forces."²⁰

Nonetheless, as the Soviets recognize, there are countercurrents to the main stream of emphasis on air power in the United States. Thus, some Soviet military writers state:

True, some bourgeois military theoreticians attempt to demonstrate that in contemporary war technology replaces man and that the size of the personnel of the army can therefore be significantly reduced. But the bankruptcy of such "theories" is obvious even to the imperialists themselves, who in practice conduct a policy of preparation of mass armies.²¹

Consequently, despite the preference of the

¹⁷Marshal of Aviation K. Vershinin, *Pravda*, July 19, 1949.

¹⁸See especially D. Kondratkov, "The Morale Factor in the Evaluation of Bourgeois Military Science," *Sovetskii flot*, January 6, 1957; and also Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi kapitalisticheskikh stran o kharaktere i sposobakh vedeniia sovremennoi voyny*, Znanie, Moscow, [April 22] 1957, p. 46 (hereafter cited as *Voennye ideologi*); a Retired General, *Izvestiia*, January 19, 1954; Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 83; Col. S. Kozlov *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 18, 1954; Col. I. Sokolov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, [February 3] 1955, p. 150; and Col. N. Kramarenko, *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956.

¹⁹Col. I. Sokolov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 154.

²⁰Col. I. Maryganov, *Peredovoi kharakter*, October 30, 1953, p. 124.

²¹Col. G. Petrov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 144. See also Col. P. Kashirin, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 10, October, 1952, p. 16.

¹⁴See the discussion in chapter 4 of the author's forthcoming volume, and See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine* (Glencoe, Ill., 1953), pp. 253-57. For a later statement, see Col. S. Kozlov, *Vooruzhenie armii*, 1954, pp. 3-4.

¹⁵Col. E. Chalik, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1954, p. 28. See also Col. V. Petrov, "What Is Military Potential?" *Sovetskii flot*, September 20, 1956.

¹⁶See the discussion in Chapter 4 of the author's forthcoming volume.

perialists for a military power based on advanced technology and weapons, "they are forced, more and more, to recognize that future war will be conducted by armies of millions and will have a long and drawnout character."²² Such statements have appeared ever since 1950, and continue at present.²³ These Soviet affirmations for the need for a mass ground army are based both upon statements by leading U.S. Army leaders (Generals Taylor, Bolte, Ridgway, Gruenther, Bradley, Collins, and Eisenhower—in the period before his election to the presidency),²⁴ and on the build-up in the strength of the U. S. Army from 1950 to 1953. The forced recognition of the need for large ground armies is explained particularly on the basis of two events: the American experience in the Korean War and the Soviet acquisition of an atomic capability.

The war in Korea is held to have "demonstrated the adventurism" of such views "as the dominance of air forces in the military structure" and confirmed that mass ground armies are essential.²⁵

²²Maj. Gen. M. Smirnov, in *O sovetskoi voennoi nauke*, 1954, p. 168.

²³Maj. Gen. N. Petrov, "The Military Ideology of the American Imperialists," *Krasnaia zvezda*, October 6, 1950; Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 9, 1952; Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 80; Col. I. Sokolov, in *Marksizm leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 150; Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, pp. 66-67; Col. Yu. Pshenianik, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, March 17, 1957; and esp. see Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, p. 50.

²⁴For example, Eisenhower and Bradley are mentioned by Maj. Gen. N. Petrov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, October 6, 1950; Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 9, 1952; and Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 80; and Bradley also by V. Skopin, *Militarizm*, [August 3] 1956, p. 407. Ridgway is cited, *inter alia*, by Maj. V. Garin, *Voennii vestnik*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 77; Lt. Col. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; Maj. Gen. N. Tsigichko, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1955, p. 80; Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955; and Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 66. Gruenther is mentioned by N. Kondratov, *Sovetskii flot*, January 6, 1957. Generals Taylor and Bolte, Ridgway and Bradley, are singled out by Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, in *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, p. 46.

Similarly, and roughly contemporaneously, Soviet procurement of atomic weapons is said to have "cooled in no small degree the interests of the military circles of the USA" for the idea of an air-atomic strategy.²⁶ In fact, it is sometimes said to have led to a realization that "in the past the evaluation of the potentialities of the atomic bomb was grossly exaggerated."²⁷ And, of course, apprehension of the increased danger from a Soviet nuclear blow is believed to have had its effect. As one Soviet colonel, who has for years contributed articles on United States military affairs, stated in mid-1955:

However, if one does not consider the self-confident youth of the strategic air force, dreaming with their commander General LeMay of a "lightning" war against the USSR, among the other categories of American military men far from optimistic attitudes are prevalent. Many have come to realize that in case of the unleashing of war a powerful retaliation blow will follow.²⁸

Thus, under the pressure of circumstances and with the "lesson" of Korea, a substantial number of American military leaders are said to have been forced to the conclusion that mass armies are needed. "However," in the words of Major General Pukhovskiy, "from an awareness of the necessity for multi-million-man armies to their creation is a tremendous distance."²⁹ One way in which the "imperialists" are said to seek to overcome this obstacle is deception of the masses.

Therefore bourgeois military science, although it understands the significance of the morale factor, is nonetheless in this connec-

²⁵Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovskiy, *Voennii restnik*, No. 1, January, 1954, pp. 20-21, and in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, February, 1955, pp. 103-104; and Col. N. Kramarenko, *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956.

²⁶Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955. For an earlier statement, see Maj. Gen. N. Petrov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, October 6, 1950.

²⁷Maj. V. Garin, *Voennii vestnik*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 77.

²⁸Col. B. Karpovich, *Voennii vestnik*, No. 6, June, 1955, p. 81. See also Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 67.

²⁹Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovskiy, *Voennii vestnik*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 21.

tion forced to proceed on the basis of a false interpretation of the aim of war, and with false slogans of reactionary imperialist propaganda. In creating a mass army the imperialists try in every way to conceal and mask from the masses the true aims of these armies.³⁰

In view of the difficulties in creating a mass army, despite a certain awareness of its need in modern war, the imperialists are thus forced to compromise with their preference for a war based on technology instead of man. And from this need was born the concept of "balanced forces."

Beginning in early 1954, and stressed particularly throughout 1955, Soviet writers paid considerable attention to this theory. Major General Khlopov, writing in *Military Thought* in January, 1954, concluded that "the majority of influential political and military figures in the U.S.A. support the theory of balanced armed forces."³¹ Another article, in April, 1954, identified this concept as official:

As is well known, the officially accepted theory in the USA in recent years is the so-called theory of "balanced armed forces," which considers that in contemporary war the army, aviation, and the navy have equal significance. . . . In accordance with this theory, the three basic forms of armed forces are relatively equally divided and allocated.³²

Subsequent statements in 1955, and even in 1956 and 1957, have reiterated attention to

the theory of balanced forces.³³ Major General Boltin in August, 1955, declared that imperialist theories of atomic *blitzkrieg* and push-button war were not held as "the official doctrines of contemporary armies of the powerful capitalist countries."³⁴ According to General Boltin, "attention is being devoted in the major capitalist countries to the development of all branches of the armed forces, all arms and means of combat." But the continued trend in American military thinking toward reliance on air-atomic deterrent power has led to a Soviet reassessment of American views on "balanced forces." Thus Colonel Kononenko, writing in September, 1956, concluded that the three-year "new look" plan for 1954-1957 "marks the funeral of the former official conception of 'balanced forces' according to which the army, navy, and air force were considered as relatively equally important elements of military power" and with approximately equal budgetary allocations.³⁵

Even when Soviet commentators have indicated the prevalence of the concept of balanced forces, they also have noted that in accordance with the recognition of air power as the dominant arm "in practice, the American military have given preference to the air forces."³⁶ In fact, it has even been stated that "the military leaders of the USA in practice devote predominant attention to military air power and the navy, as if they could in largest measure determine the fate of the

³⁰Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955; and Major A. Sapronov, *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 12, December, 1956, pp. 74-78.

³¹Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mys'l*, No. 1, January, 1954, pp. 79-80.

³²M. Kremntsev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 10, 1954.

³³See esp. Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, pp. 46-50; Col. Yu. Pshenianik, *Sovetskaia aviatsiia*, March 17, 1957; Col. S. Kozlov, *Sovetskii flot*, January 25, 1957; Col. N. Kramarenko, *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956; Maj. Gen. N. Pukhovskiy, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, [February 3] 1955, p. 103; Col. M. Mil'shtein, "The Structure and Organization of the American Armed Forces," *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 25, 1955; Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; Maj. Gen. N. Tsigichko, *Voennaia mys'l*, No. 4, April, 1955, pp. 80-81; and Col. A. Bagreev, *Voennaia mys'l*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 87.

³⁴Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955.

³⁵Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 68.

³⁶Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955. See also Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, pp. 52 and 63; Admiral V. Platonov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 14, 1956; Col. M. Mil'shtein, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 25, 1955; Col. V. Vasilenko, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 103; M. Kremntsev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 10, 1954; and Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mys'l*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 84. The only exception was Maj. Gen. Ye. Boltin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955.

entire war. Her ground forces are in fact considered as auxiliary forces, a strategic reserve. . . .³⁷

The existence of a variety of military views in the United States is explained by Soviet writers on the grounds of selfish service conflicts, and conflicts among competing business interests. Thus an article in *Red Star* (in 1955) declared that

the existence of a great number of these theories is evidence that American military circles have met with difficulties in working out the plan of a new aggressive war. It is impossible not to take into consideration that while some military theories are designed for the disorientation and deception of the masses that others express the struggles of various monopolistic groups for receiving high profits from military orders.³⁸

The importance of this Soviet belief is attested to not only by its frequent reiteration, but by the fact that the conflict of competing monopolies is even said to be more important than doctrinal differences and service rivalries in determining the American military budgetary allocations and military force levels.³⁹ It is on this basis, according to General Khlopov (in 1954) that

some monopolistic groups in the USA and their advocates in the Pentagon attack the main theses of the theory of balanced armed forces. The wrangling among the representatives of the land, air and sea forces of the USA for priority of one or another form of the armed forces in a future war has not ceased to this time. For the various monopolistic circles this is no simply technical [military] question. Recognition of the leading role in the system of the armed forces, for example, of the air forces, leads to their in-

crease, investment in their development of more significant budget appropriations, an increase of government orders to aviation firms, and in the final analysis solid profits to the latter. . . .⁴⁰

Other military writers also state that in the pre-eminence given in practice to the air forces "no small role is played by the struggle of the most powerful monopolist firms for receiving profitable military orders at high prices."⁴¹

The current Soviet view is well summarized by Major General Mil'shtein and Colonel Slobodenko in their booklet on *Military Ideologists of the Capitalist Countries on the Character and Means of Conducting Contemporary War*, which appeared in 1957. They review the theories of "air war," "sea power," "balanced forces," and "the new look." Their conclusion is extremely interesting not merely because it reiterates the long-expressed views noted above, but because it reveals so clearly Soviet military thinking. Air power in the atomic age "has enormous significance for the achievement of victory in contemporary war. . . . However, the views of American military ideologists, tying their hopes in future war only to aviation and underevaluating the role of other branches of the armed forces borders on adventurism."⁴² Similarly, while "of course it would be a crude mistake to underestimate the role of naval forces in combat operations in war. . . . Nonetheless the contentions of the military theoreticians of American imperialism on an 'exceptional' role for the navy in war must be considered erroneous, not meeting the objective requirements of the armed conflict."⁴³ The "new look" is recognized as "a compro-

³⁷Col. Vasilenko, *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 216.

³⁸Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955.

³⁹See esp. Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 71; Col. A. Bozhenko and V. Osipov, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1951, p. 85; and S. M. Vishnev, *Sovremennyyi militarizm i monopolii* (Contemporary Militarism and Monopolies), Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, Moscow, [November 29] 1952, *passim*.

⁴⁰Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, pp. 80, 84.

⁴¹Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; and see Col. N. Kramarenko, *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956.

⁴²Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologii*, 1957, p. 45.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 51.

mise between two theories of conducting war. On the one hand, it recognizes the necessity [*sic*] of the equal development of all forms of the armed forces . . . but, on the other hand, it still gives a preference to the development of the air forces. . . ."⁴⁴ What does this leave? The theory of balanced forces recognizes that "the aim of military operations must be the defeat of the armed forces [of the enemy], and not strategic bombing of targets in the rear."⁴⁵ This, of course, is the Soviet strategic concept. And thus in contrast to its evaluation of the theories of air war, sea power, and new look as respectively adventurist, erroneous, and falling between two strategies, the theory of balanced forces is seen as the correct one. "Many bourgeois military theoreticians have been compelled to consider *the objective requirements of contemporary war, victory in which can only be achieved by close combined operation of all three services of the armed forces.*"⁴⁶

Thus we see that the Soviet image of the United States military-force structure is characterized by the following conclusions:

(1) American military policy has at least until recently set as its goal the creation of "balanced forces"—land, air, and sea—but with a powerful bias toward reliance upon strategic nuclear air power. While the Soviets now sometimes recognize that the "new look" has dropped the idea of balanced forces, they cannot imagine that the United States fails to recognize the great importance which they themselves attribute to maintenance of continued powerful ground forces.⁴⁷ Nonetheless, they must and do recognize the increased reliance on air power, while exaggerating the degree of continued attention to the ground forces.

(2) One cause of the reliance upon air power is said to be a fear and distrust of mass

armies, which cannot be expected to maintain, in capitalist countries, the necessary resilient morale required by modern war (nuclear or non-nuclear). Nonetheless, the need for mass ground armies cannot be escaped; hence the compromise idea of balanced forces, and more recently attempts to maintain a modern if smaller army.

(3) Another cause of the bias toward air power is an exaggeration of the properties of advanced military technology and new weapons, especially nuclear weapons.

(4) A third cause of bias toward air power is the influence of powerful monopolies whose profits derive from aircraft production, although other monopolies compete for military expenditures and support the balanced forces concept.

EVALUATION OF U.S. MILITARY STRATEGIES

American military strategy is usually described in terms of two or three phases. "The main element of the first phase," as General Mil'shtein and Colonel Slobodenko put it, "will be not only gaining dominion of the air and on the sea. . . . Together with that also the mass and determined operations of the air forces and navy and long-range guided missiles with the employment of means of mass destruction [nuclear and thermonuclear warheads] against the main population centers of the enemy, the most important economic-political targets, industrial regions, rail centers, oil-processing factories and reserves of fuel, stockpiles, air and naval bases, etc. It is presumed that by these operations the economic and morale condition of the enemy will be undermined, breaking the resistance of the democratic [Communist] camp. . . ."⁴⁸

The second phase (for those who picture the strategy in three phases) is the exploitation stage, with extended land campaigns conducted primarily by the American allies.

⁴⁸Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, p. 55.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, p. 52.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 50.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 36-38, *et al.*

Then, "the American army, according to the plans of these strategists, will enter the war only in its concluding stage (the second or third stage) to complete the defeat of the weakened enemy. . . ."⁴⁹

The theory of the two- or three-phase strategy is widely stated in both general and limited-circulation publications. It is, of course, criticized as "false" and "adventurist."⁵⁰

Two aspects of this strategy deserve further attention. One is the role assigned to air power, the other is the role of allied armies in the first stage or stages of the war. The first of these is discussed directly below, the second in the following section.

Colonel Rodin expresses the Soviet view as follows: "According to this theory, in the most difficult initial period of war the United States will participate only by means of 'strategic bombing.' It is not difficult to see these theories are built on sand. . . ."⁵¹ There is one additional role which some Soviet writers have ascribed to American air power: the use of air-borne troops to occupy strategic rear areas.⁵² In fact, Colonel Kononenko has even declared that "the majority of representatives of American military circles consider that the key to success is air mobility of

the troops," and cites Lt. General Gavin to this effect.⁵³

The American strategy of employment, in the first phase, of strategic air power is considered as the basis for American establishment of a network of overseas air bases. American military (especially air) bases "located on the territory of others . . . are a component of the adventurist strategy" of the United States.⁵⁴ In fact, "the creation of a net of air and naval bases is one of the fundamental conceptions of the American 'global' strategy."⁵⁵ The United States was said in April, 1957, to have over 950 military bases on foreign soil.⁵⁶ The very existence of overseas American air bases is said to be evidence of American aggressive intent, although this may be but propaganda. Marshal Zhukov could hardly have been serious, in claiming the existence of bases as *proof* of aggressive intent, when he stated in May, 1955:

Soon after the end of the war the American government . . . began to create aggressive military blocs and a whole system of military bases on foreign territories. For the purpose of deceiving people all this was masked under allegations of "defense," although any thinking person understands that the military bases of the USA, created around the USSR, China and the countries of peoples' democracy, are absurd from the standpoint of a defensive strategy for the United States, since

⁴⁹Col. N. Rodin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 70. See also Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, p. 56.

⁵⁰Col. N. Kramarenko, *Sovetskii flot*, December 26, 1956; Col. V. A. Zakharov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, 1957, p. 278; Lt. Gen. A. Sukhomlin, *News*, No. 12, June, 1954, p. 10; Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; Col. V. Vasilenko, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, [February 3] 1955, p. 216; Col. A. Mikhailov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 9, September, 1955, p. 73; Col. N. Rodin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 70; Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 83; V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 6, June, 1950, p. 73; Col. M. Milantsev, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1949, p. 81.

⁵¹Col. N. Rodin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 70.

⁵²Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, "Military Strategy," *Bol'shaia sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), XLI ([April 21], 1956), 73; and Col. M. Milantsev, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1949, p. 82.

⁵³Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 71.

⁵⁴Col. Ye. Kosorukov and Lt. Col. V. Matsulenko, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 7, July, 1955, p. 92; and see Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 10, 1955.

⁵⁵M. Kremmentsev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 10, 1954.

⁵⁶M. Kazantsev, "U.S. Military Bases—A Threat to the Peace and Security of Peoples," *Sovetskii patriot*, April 10, 1957; Col. M. Tolchenov, *Amerikanskii voennye bazy na chuzhikh territoriiakh—ugroza miru i bezopasnosti narodov* (American Military Bases on Foreign Territories—A Threat to Peace and the Security of Nations), *Znanie*, Moscow, [January 20], 1955, p. 6. See also Lt. Gen. A. Sukhomlin, *News*, No. 12, June, 1954, p. 10; Col. N. Chistov, "American Air Bases," *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 10, October, 1951, pp. 81 ff.; and T. Belashchenko, "The Real Purpose of American Military Bases [Overseas]," *Krasnaia zvezda*, October 11, 1956.

they are so far from the objectives which must be defended that at any moment they can be annihilated one by one. It is another matter to use these bases in the aims of aggressive strategy, for dealing blows by an atomic air force. And it is precisely for that purpose that they are being built.⁵⁷

Nonetheless, he may have been expressing genuine apprehension over the danger of American air attacks from these bases. Marshal Bagramian, on the same occasion, also stated that the existence of a net of American bases "indubitably means" that American deployment is not defensive.⁵⁸

Marshal Zhukov's statement cited above also ascribes a high degree of vulnerability to the advanced American air bases (although hardly by their being attacked "one by one"). As early as 1953 it was said that "the closer their [U.S.] military bases are to the objective of attack, the more vulnerable these bases become."⁵⁹ The commander-in-chief of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal of Aviation Vershinin, declared more recently (1957) that "one can only wonder at the shortsightedness of those who do not consider that if these [NATO and U.S.] bases are close to us, then they are also not far from us."⁶⁰

It is interesting, and perhaps significant, that Soviet discussions of American military strategies do not reflect awareness of the Western objective of *deterrence*. To be sure, the Soviets would not publicly admit any justifiable American *need* to deter them, since they deny aggressive aims. But just as American claims of various defensive measures are raised and defensive purpose denied by the Soviets, it would be feasible for them to note and deny in their propaganda the need for

deterrence. But the very idea of deterrence has not, as of this writing, been raised in serious Soviet discussions of American military thought.

In summary, in the Soviet evaluation, the main aspects of American strategic plans are:

(1) The theory of a two- or three-phase war, in which the first phase(s) are marked by active American strategic bombing of the Soviet bloc, and limited land and sea holding actions to maintain the necessary overseas air bases and bridgeheads.

(2) The first and/or intermediate phase is also marked by dependence upon allied ground forces to hold the enemy generally in check while strategic bombing destroys his economic and morale resources, and while the American army is mobilized and readied.

(3) The final phase is marked by commitment of U.S. ground forces to destroy the greatly weakened enemy.

(4) In the Soviet view, this theory is not well founded, and, in published discussions at least, they aver that it would not be successful. The reasoning behind this conclusion will be reviewed in discussing Soviet views on the enemy's strengths and weaknesses.

ARMED ALLIANCES OF THE FREE WORLD

The United States is seen as the main enemy and the driving force behind "a new coalition of capitalist states" in the postwar period. Moreover, it is conceded that "the ruling circles of the USA do not lack forces and means for the welding of North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Pacific and other military-political aggressive blocs."⁶¹ Nonetheless, "the anti-Soviet blocs include states divided by contradictions," and are therefore not stable or reliable.⁶² The system of military alliances, as the manning of overseas air bases, is declared to be "a concrete manifesta-

⁵⁷ Marshal G. Zhukov, "The Tenth Anniversary of a Great Victory," *Pravda*, May 8, 1955.

⁵⁸ Marshal I. Bagramian, "The Historic Victory of the Soviet People," *Oktiabr'*, No. 5, May, 1955, p. 112.

⁵⁹ Col. M. Tolchenev, *Radio Moscow*, Home Service, October 14, 1953.

⁶⁰ Marshal of Av. K. Vershinin, *Pravda*, September 8, 1957.

⁶¹ Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaiia mys'*, No. 1, January, 1954, p. 78.

⁶² *Ibid.*

tion of the aggressive policy and ideology of the imperialists."⁶³

The most interesting aspect of the Soviet view of armed alliances in the Free World is their interpretation of the role of these alliances in American strategy. On the whole, the less powerful states of the West are considered more as object than subject in the creation and operation of alliances. In addition to the United States, only the United Kingdom is sometimes specified as an active power—and then usually as but one of a number "in support" of United States policy.⁶⁴

The American theory of "balanced forces," and still more the recent increasingly unbalanced American forces, are said to be predicated upon the use of allied ground forces.

For conducting the war in land theaters, especially in its initial phase, the American militarists, in accord with the strategy of global war, count upon utilizing above all the armies of countries dependent upon the USA.⁶⁵

As a consequence of this division of military-force contributions, "in the first stage or phase of the war, the brunt of the fighting will be borne by the land armies of the European NATO members, the Near and Middle East countries and Japan."⁶⁶

Thus, the primary role of the armed alliances in American strategy is "to wage the war on foreign territory and with foreign armies. . . ." ⁶⁷ This view of the first phases of a war has long been a standard Soviet view.⁶⁸

⁶³Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 10, 1955.

⁶⁴Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955.

⁶⁵*Ibid.*

⁶⁶Lt. Gen. A. Sukhomlin, *News*, No. 12, June, 1954, p. 10. See also Col. A. Kononenko, *International Affairs*, No. 2, February, 1957, pp. 63-64.

⁶⁷*Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁶⁸Maj. Gen. M. Mil'shtein and Col. A. Slobodenko, *Voennye ideologi*, 1957, pp. 54 and 63; Marshal G. Zhukov, *Pravda*, February 20, 1956; Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 67; Col. M. P. Tolchenov, *Voennye bloki imperialist-*

Finally, to note one other alleged purpose of the alliance systems, Soviet writers assert that by means of bases and troops established in other lands the United States seeks also "to hold in compulsory service those countries on whose territories these bases are located, and also other nearby states," in short, "tasks of a gendarme character."⁶⁹

EVALUATION OF ENEMY STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

Soviet strategy is considered to possess a scientific form of decision-making, a "calculation of the relation of forces" between the Soviet power and the enemy.⁷⁰ In calculating the relation of forces in national military strategy, the key element is a balancing of relative strength and potential in the permanently-operating factors. In other general terms, as Lt. General Krasil'nikov of the General Staff has put it: "The ability of a country to conduct a war depends not only on military potential, but also on economic and political [morale] potentialities."⁷¹ It is useful to elucidate the Soviet evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the enemy,

icheskikh gosudarstv—ugroza miru i bezopasnosti narodov (Military Blocs of the Imperialist States—A Threat to Peace and the Security of Peoples), *Znanie*, Moscow, [May 16], 1956, p. 7; Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, December 10, 1955; Lt. Col. P. Derevianko, *Krasnaia zvezda*, March 26, 1955; Col. M. Mil'shtein, *Krasnaia zvezda*, February 25, 1955; Col. N. Rodin, *Vestnik vozdushnogo flota*, No. 11, November, 1954, p. 70; Lt. Gen. A. Sukhomlin, *News*, No. 12, June, 1954, pp. 10-11; M. Kremmentsev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April, 10, 1954; Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1954, pp. 76-77 and 81-82; Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 9, 1952; Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 1, January, 1950, pp. 73 and 76; and Col. M. Milantsev, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 4, April, 1949, p. 81; *et al.*

⁶⁹M. Kremmentsev, *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 10, 1954; Col. A. Kononenko, *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, No. 9, September, 1956, p. 67; and A. Leont'ev, on *Radio Moscow*, Home Service, March 7, 1957.

⁷⁰See Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, pp. 16-19; and Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policy-Making," *World Politics*, IV (October, 1951), 85-111.

⁷¹Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 30, 1955.

in terms of Soviet conceptions of the enemy's strategy.

As we have seen, Soviet military thinking continues to reject reliance on any "atomic," strategic air, surprise, or *blitzkreig* strategy. Consequently, tendencies in the enemy's strategic planning toward reliance upon these factors is believed faulty. Nonetheless, the enormous destruction—even though not necessarily resulting in defeat—which enemy nuclear and thermonuclear attack and strategic bombing would bring causes serious apprehension. In particular, it is feared that Western failure to recognize the true requirements for winning a war may lead "gambling" Western strategists into "adventures." Since the Soviets profess to have a superiority in the decisive factors, an appreciation of true strategic requirements by the enemy is more to be desired than a false enemy assurance which leads to a losing, but terribly destructive, strategy.

The military strengths of the enemy are appreciated, particularly American strategic nuclear air power. Nonetheless, not only is the American military strategy judged faulty on doctrinal bases, but it also is seen as presupposing a weaker opponent than the Soviets believe themselves to be. As Major General Khlopov stated it in the non-public General Staff journal *Military Thought* as early as 1950 (but reflecting a continuing Soviet view):

The bankruptcy of the [American] plans for future war. . . consists in the fact that almost all proceed from extremely favorable conditions, in which the enemy [the U.S.S.R.] will be so weak in the air that it will be possible in the first phase of the war to complete flights to targets selected by the Americans with impunity. The enemy will be so weak on the ground that the coalition army which will face him in the initial period of the war (composed of allies and in part of Americans themselves) can successfully hold their troops [*sic*] and gain time for the transfer of forces and matériel from across the ocean. If one

discards these favorable circumstances and takes real conditions, when the enemy [i.e., the Soviet bloc] places in the air active opposition and himself will make mighty air raids with the use of the newest means of armament to disrupt and destroy the transfer and concentration of troops, when the enemy will have ground forces which are in a condition (not anticipating American transfers from across the ocean) to deploy powerful offensive operations of a large scale, with a high tempo of advance, then the bridgehead on which the American militarists count to concentrate and deploy their forces for land engagements will be liquidated, and the plans for the war buried with them. The war will in this case assume an entirely different character than is planned by the . . . USA.⁷²

This passage is also quite revealing in its statements on the "enemy" (Soviet) strategy, making explicit a unique confirmation of the Soviet objective, in a major war, of completely seizing the European continent. Thus both the bases and bridgeheads on the European (and Asian) continents will be lost to the enemy.

An additional flaw seen in the American strategy is its neglect to recognize that the United States itself would be subjected to retaliatory nuclear attack, with its morale weakened, and its economic and military mobilization and military deployment seriously disrupted. We have earlier noted that the American overseas bases are said to be highly vulnerable.

Finally, one reason for the conclusion that the ground forces counted upon to hold major bridgeheads and lines in the first phase of the war will not succeed is not military but political. The political foundation for the reliance upon the masses who must be called upon to form the necessary large ground armies is believed to be weak. This is especially, but not exclusively, said to be true of the non-American allied armies.⁷³ And in

⁷²Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 6, June, 1950, pp. 75-76.

⁷³Col. B. Karpovich, *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 9, 1952.

referring to professional soldiers, "the armies of the imperialist countries preserve their martial spirit, their combat *esprit*, only so long as they experience successes in combat, while they plunder. But once they meet with a serious enemy, once they begin to experience failures and defeats in battle, little will remain of their martial spirit, of their morale."⁷⁴

Western sources are cited to show that in the West the basis of morale is incorrectly sought in physical comforts, in the psychology of the individual rather than in social and class role (Liddell Hart is cited), and in religion (General Ridgway), but as a consequence of this false approach, despite extensive "propaganda" indoctrination, morale is so low that most infantrymen don't even fire their weapons (Brigadier General S. L. A. Marshall's report on Korea).⁷⁵

Morale is crucial in other ways as well. "Morale of the army" is considered a decisive factor; so is morale-political "stability of the rear." And in a total nuclear war:

The rear of the aggressors, subjected to a retaliatory atomic blow from the defending side, will be faced with a very great trial. *The use of atomic weapons against the unstable rear of the aggressor will lead to incomparably greater consequences than the use of these weapons against a strong monolithic rear*, inseparably connected with the armed forces fighting for the achievement of the just aims of the war. The attitude of the people toward the war, its readiness to undergo very great sacrifices in the name of victory, assumes still greater significance under new conditions.⁷⁶

See also Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, "Military Strategy," *Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia* (2d ed.), XLI ([April 21], 1956), pp.

⁷⁴Col. P. Kashirin, *Krasnaia zvezda*, May 28, 1955; and see Kashirin, *Voennye znaniia*, No. 8, August, 1956, p. 13.

⁷⁵Col. V. B. Belyi, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine i armii*, 1957, pp. 230-33; and see D. Kondratkov, "The Morale Factor in the Evaluation of Bourgeois Military Science," *Sovetskii flot*, January 6, 1957; and Major A. Saproinov, "American Views of the Role of the Morale Factor in War," *Voennyi vestnik*, No. 12, December, 1956, pp. 74-78.

The "aggressor" is, of course, thought of as the West; and the strong monolithic rear is that of the Soviet Union.⁷⁷

The third major element of strength is the whole complex of economic, industrial, and transportation resources, and in particular the base for armaments production. Consequently, in evaluating the enemy's strength, the Soviet military leaders are told to study the enemy's economic strength. In particular, "the tempo of increasing military production changes the relation of forces of the sides in the course of the war, influences the course of the war and, in the final analysis, the outcome of the war as a whole."⁷⁸

In estimating American industrial potential for war-making, the Soviets cannot escape the substantial superiority of the production facilities. Nonetheless, the potential alone is held to be insufficient:

A high economic potential is only the potentiality for victory, its necessary condition. In order to convert the potentiality for victory into actuality, it is necessary to utilize the resources on hand and to convert them into real military factors which directly determine the outcome of war.

War of the [current] machine period have shown that it is insufficient to have a developed economy. It is necessary to be able shown that it is insufficient to have a development basis, and to create in wartime an integrated and continually growing military economy. . . . Only a swift and basic reorganization of the economy on a military base makes possible the conversion of potential resources of the country into real military factors.⁷⁹

And, the realization of economic potentialities, it is said, "depends directly upon the social and state structure of the country." The industrial production ability of the

⁷⁶Maj. Gen. G. Pokrovsky, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, [February 3], 1955, p. 169.

⁷⁷Cf., for example, Col. P. Sidorov, "Morale Propaganda and Its Significance in Modern War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 3, 1955.

⁷⁸Col. P. Belov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 5, May, 1951, p. 18. See also Lt. Gen. S. Krasil'nikov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, August 20, 1955.

⁷⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 23-24. See also Maj. Gen. V. Khlopov, *Voennaia mysl'*, No. 6, June, 1950, p. 69.

United States is specifically said to be *not* equatable with economic-military potential.⁸⁰ Even to the extent that the United States places its economy "on a military basis already in peacetime, capitalists all the more disorganize their rear, weaken their economic and morale potentialities.⁸¹ And, in general, the Soviet system, the Soviet "social and state structure," is declared to be superior to that of the United States in economic mobilization and utilization of economic potential for military ends.⁸² Despite the high productivity of the American economy and despite alleged preparations for war, American war plans are still considered to be adventuristic.

In summary, the Soviet evaluation of the enemy's strengths and weaknesses is that in

⁸⁰Col. A. Stokov and Col. I. Maryganov, in *O sovetskoi voennoi nauke*, 1954, p. 56.

⁸¹Col. V. Petrov, in *Marksizm-leninizm o voine*, 1955, p. 111.

⁸²For example, see Col. A. Lagovsky, "Economic Potential and Its Role in Contemporary War," *Krasnaia zvezda*, July 1, 1955; and Col. N. Sushko, *Sovetskii flot*, March 22, 1957.

all major aspects—military, morale, and economic—the enemy is fundamentally inferior. Nonetheless, his very substantial strength in the military and industrial sectors is recognized. In particular, even with a losing strategy, the enemy could in his defeat unleash a rain of thermonuclear destruction on the U.S.S.R. Consequently, Soviet strategy must seek by all measures short of provoking this disaster to neutralize the danger.

This Soviet evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States and of its strategy may not represent a complete and candid picture of the actual high-level military and political estimate. In particular, they may be less sanguine about the weaknesses of the American "rear," and less certain about the strength of their own. Such considerations would not appear in military and other publications for obvious reasons. But the general evaluation as described and discussed in this paper probably reflects *on the whole* the view held by the Soviet leader.

OLD FRIENDS

George Gustav Heye: Dr. George Gustav Heye died on 20 January 1957. Dr. Heye came to the AMI through the Order of Indian Wars, of which he was an honorary life member. He was graduated from the School of Mines, Columbia University, in 1896 and received his Ph.D. from the University of Hamburg in 1929. In 1903 he started his American Anthropology Collection, which later developed into the Heye Museum in New York. In 1916 he founded, under his own directorship, the Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation, endowed it, and turned over to it his entire collection of nearly half a million specimens. Dr. Heye was also an honorary member of the Royal Anthropology Institute, London.

Charles Gerhardt: Brig. Gen. Charles Gerhardt died at his home, Mendham,

N. J., on 5 June 1957 in his 95th year. General Gerhardt, like G. G. Heye, came to the AMI via the Order of Indian Wars of which he was a life member. He was graduated from the U. S. Military Academy in 1887, and was commissioned in the Infantry. He trained and took the 4th Infantry to France in April, 1918. Promoted to be a brigadier general, he was assigned to the S.O.S., under which he organized and commanded Base Section 7 for several months. Following that he commanded various regiments and posts until his retirement for age in 1927. He was graduated from the Army War College in 1913 and again in the Class of 1922. He is survived by a daughter, the wife of Col. John H. Stutesman, USA (Ret.), and a son, Maj. Gen. Charles H. Gerhardt, USA (Ret.), Class of April, 1917, USMA.

THE SUTLER AND THE SOLDIER

BY ALFRED J. TAPSON*

ALTHOUGH his remarks may be punctuated by caustic comments about "belly-wash beer" and other "gripes," the soldier of World War II will usually admit that the post exchange—the "PX"—made army life more tolerable. Through this agency the American soldier acquired at low prices the semi-necessities and semi-luxuries to which he was accustomed at home. These material comforts had morale value in themselves; more important, however, was the contribution of the post exchange to the satisfaction of the normal gregarious instincts of the troops. Here the "GI" met with his friends, told jokes, drank beer, cursed his officers, and glorified his home state or town.

Doubtless the men of the Civil War occupied themselves in much the same fashion when they gathered at the tent of the sutler—the private operator who sold non-issue goods in the army camps. Both sutler and post exchange provided a meeting place for soldiers, but any further resemblance between the two institutions is remote. A search through the plethora of diaries, reminiscences, and personal narratives uncovers few favorable comments on the sutler. This is understandable since it was the sutler who charged the fighting man ten cents for a stamped envelope and five cents for a sheet of paper; it was the sutler who often took large shares of his earnings on payday; it was the sutler who sold him pie "' with a taste resembling rancid lard and sour apples," which was "moist and

indigestible below, tough and indestructible above, with untold horrors between.'"¹

The sutler had been an authorized adjunct of the American Army since the inception of the nation, and there were regulations concerning him in the Articles of War at the time of the American Revolution.² Despite this official military cognizance of his existence, the sutler attracted little public or political attention except in times of national crises when many civilians found themselves in uniform. Abuses suffered by the regulars were ignored, but any ill-treatment of the citizen-soldier had repercussions on the home front. During the Mexican War, for example, the sutlers were deprived of any lien on soldiers' pay and were forbidden to sit at the pay table.³ A few years after the war, however, these restrictions were repealed. Army Regulations of 1857 listed the sutler as an ap-

¹Charles William Bardeen, *A Little Fifer's War Diary* (Syracuse, 1910), p. 47. In conducting these fleecing operations, the sutler was apparently acting in accordance with the ancient practices of his trade. The derivation of the word from the Dutch verb *soetelen*, "to befoul, to perform mean duties," and the German *sudeln* meaning "to do dirty work" indicates the somewhat besmirched ancestry of the sutler's calling. The remark, "I shall sutler be unto the campe and profits will accrue" by one of Shakespeare's characters in *Henry V* illustrates that sutlering, however "mean" or "dirty," was for centuries associated with pecuniary gain at the expense of the soldier.

²During the Revolution the chief article purveyed by sutlers was liquor, and General Washington was much more concerned with the high prices of the product than with the physical and moral effects of consumption. The commander-in-chief felt that stimulants could hardly be prohibited to his ragged soldiers since "the benefits arising from the moderate use of strong Liquor have been experienced in all Armies, and are not to be disputed." After once banning the sutlers, Washington readmitted them to camps under rigid regulation. They were allowed to sell only three articles: tobacco, liquor, and soap.

³*Congressional Globe*, 29 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 189.

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proved element in the military system with definite rules for his appointment and removal, the regulation of his prices, and the amount of assessment which could be levied against him. Post libraries were largely maintained by a regular tax on the sutler.⁴

These regulations were applicable to the Regular Army in 1861 with only minor modifications, but the outpouring of troops at the beginning of hostilities resulted in a multiple military administrative system. The volunteer forces, the state militias, and the Regular Army all had their own methods of operation and dissimilar regulations. It was in the new additions to the armed forces of the nation that the sutlership system soon gave evidence of being inadequate, corrupt, and a source of great profit to a few men at the expense of the soldier.

A clear-cut appointing policy at the inception of hostilities might have prevented later abuses, but there was no fixed policy for the appointment of officers, much less sutlers. The judicious appointment of Pennsylvania politicians to sutlerships caused Secretary of War Cameron considerable anxiety.⁵ State militia regulations normally gave appointive authority to commanding officers of camps and posts. For the most part, these officers were named by governors on the basis of personal friendship, political opportunism, business relationships, or the ability to bring in recruits. They, in turn, used the same criteria in the selection of sutlers. In October, 1861, a survey of two hundred regiments revealed the wide range of methods by which sutlers were appointed. In one hundred and three regiments the sutlers were named by the commanding officer, in sixty-three they owed their positions to the Secretary of War, in fourteen they were appointed

by a board of regimental officers, and in five by the governors of the states. The remaining organizations were without sutlers. "Informal" sutlers were also present; in one regiment sixteen were doing business although only one could display an official appointment.⁶

These positions were eagerly sought. The possibilities of enormous profits and the monopolistic nature of the positions made sutlerships the aim of many individuals, scrupulous and unscrupulous. Newspapers contained numerous advertisements offering a "liberal bonus" or promising "liberal arrangements" if an appointment could be secured. The *New York Herald* of October 22, 1861, contained the following advertisement in its classified section:

SUTLERS.—A YOUNG MAN OF EXPERIENCE in the sutler's business wishes situation as clerk. Can give the best of reference[s] from last employer and from officers of the army. Would loan his employer \$500 if necessary. . . .⁷

Apparently even the lowly position of clerk held peculiar possibilities of gain. Nor were the hopes of rich rewards in vain. Congressional investigators discovered one sutler who showed a profit of ten thousand dollars after eight months. Sutler's sales to the Army of the Potomac equalled an estimated value of ten million dollars, fifty per cent of which was pure profit.⁸

Prices were set at the highest point the traffic would bear. Items selling for seventy-five cents in New York or Philadelphia were sold by sutlers for over two dollars. Butter, high at fifty cents per pound in the general market, cost the troops one dollar. Cheese brought fifty cents a pound, and condensed

⁴United States War Department, *Regulations for the Army of the United States, 1857* (New York, 1857), pars. 202-209.

⁵William Addleman Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (New York and London, 1924), p. 250.

⁶Frederick Law Olmstead, "A Report to the Secretary of War on the Operations of the Sanitary Commission . . ." (Washington, 1861), *War of Secession Pamphlets*, VII, 33.

⁷*New York Herald*, October 22, 1861.

⁸*Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 272 and 1144.

milk, normally four cans for twenty-five cents, sold for seventy-five cents per can.⁹ A general order of the War Department specifically called to the sutler's attention the illegality of selling postage or stamped envelopes at more than the post-office price,¹⁰ but the sutler solved this problem by raising the price of stationery and ink. The *New York Tribune* reported that sutlers sold forged Congressional franking privileges.¹¹ With considerable truth, the Union soldier unsentimentally sang of the sutler's tent as "the dearest spot on earth to me."¹²

The sutler's establishment resembled a general store. Tobacco, razors, shoe polish, combs, buttons, needles, thread, and other small items were always for sale, but the monotony of army fare made any barely-palatable edibles the source of greatest profit. Advertisements of goods offered for sale to sutlers give some idea of the scope of their wares. Thus, such "sutler's stores" as "preserved meats, fruits, vegetables, game, oysters, fish, sauces, pickles, jams, jellies, preserves, solidified and condensed milk, prepared coffee, cocoa, [and] brandy," "warranted to keep in any climate" were offered "for sale cheap by A. Kemp and Day Co., 116 Wall Street, New York City."¹³ Tired of "salt horse and hardtack," what more could the soldier ask?

Army medical men were highly vocal in opposition to the sutler system as a peril to the health of the men. One brigade surgeon attributed ten per cent of the worst grades of diseases to the sutlers' tempting indigestibles. Troops recently discharged from hospitals died after "drinking their strychnine whisky, eating their rancid nuts, and putrid

animal food, such as sausages, pies, &c."¹⁴ With some absence of objectivity, one "medic" claimed that he could always select the sutler from a crowd of men by his "thieving-looking countenance."¹⁵

The food purveyed by the sutler was probably not of the highest quality, but the soldiers bought it. Troops not uncommonly threw away their rations and lived from the sutler's stock of food. Other individuals, with more substantial appetites, ate their entire ration and supplemented the meal with three or four "villainous" pies.¹⁶ Indigestible or not, it was a slow day on which the sutler failed to sell six hundred and fifty pies.¹⁷

The liquor problem was a matter of even more serious concern. Early regulations placed no restrictions on the sale of spirits to the volunteer soldier, and Guinness' Stout and Bourbon whiskey were openly advertised as supplies for sutlers. Many individual regiments had stringent prohibitions against the sale of liquor to the men, but enforcement was lax and anyone who desired alcohol could usually obtain it. An army-wide ban was placed on all intoxicating drinks in December, 1861, but sutlers and men continued to use countless undercover devices to bring bottles of liquor into posts and camps. Flasks marked "cordials" or "hospital stores" were familiar hiding places, as were kegs of butter and barrels of apples.¹⁸ Taking advantage of officers' prerogatives to buy liquor, sutlers simply placed an officer's name on a package and brought it safely through inspection. To prevent this ruse, the Army of the Potomac ordered all officers' packages delivered within twenty-four hours after their arrival in camp, but this command was

⁹Bardeen, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

¹⁰United States War Department, *General Orders of the War Department . . . 1861, 1862, & 1863* (2 vols.; New York, 1864), I, 359.

¹¹*New York Tribune*, December 12, 1861.

¹²Bardeen, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

¹³*New York Herald*, December 12, 1861.

¹⁴G. W. Stipp (Brigade Surgeon) to Senator Henry Wilson, January 29, 1862, in *Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 538.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶Sanitary Commission, *op. cit.*, p. 33n.

¹⁷Bardeen, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

¹⁸*Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 69.

signally ineffective since any sutler worthy of the name could sell almost any amount of whiskey within one day.¹⁹

In addition to food and drink, the sutler handled other articles of interest. Although gambling was a violation of army regulations, playing cards and other accessories were sold. "TO SUTLERS," began an advertisement, "WELLING'S PATENT COMPRESSED Ivory Counters, white, red, blue, green and yellow, used as change among the soldiers. Samples sent free."²⁰ Even the most naive might regard these words as a suspiciously accurate description of poker chips. Other items such as stationery, printed handkerchiefs, and the "Volunteers' Relief Ointment, the best in use for men and horses," also found their way to the sutler's tent.²¹ The sale of footwear brought complaints from officers because the men discarded their heavy-issue boots and bought light ones unfit for marching. At least two instances came to light proving sutlers guilty of distributing counterfeit money to the men.²²

The legal lien on the pay brought as much adverse effect on the soldier's pocketbook as the food and drink did to his health and morals. The peculiar ability of the sutler to keep the men in a state of perpetual debt brought complaints from families and forced Congress to pass an allotment act permitting part of army pay to be sent directly home. The last part of this bill abrogated the right of the sutlers to a lien on pay, but it was later restored.²³

The general order of December, 1861, in addition to banning the sale of liquor, regulated the sutler's working hours and made him subject to all the rules and discipline of

war. More important it fixed definite responsibility on officers to see that good and wholesome provisions were supplied at reasonable rates.²⁴ The vagueness of such terms as "wholesome provisions" and "a reasonable price," however, made enforcement difficult even for the most conscientious commander. Many inexperienced officers were already obligated to the sutler and could not enforce the new regulations without suffering personal embarrassment. Others were unwilling to terminate additions to their incomes acquired through questionable relationships with sutlers. That the army made an effort to end these practices is indicated, for example, by the court-martial conviction of Col. Samuel Graham for connivance with a sutler.²⁵

But it was neither the dishonesty nor the inefficiency of commanders that was the basic cause of failure to control the sutler. Fundamentally, he was a necessary evil. When troops were stationed away from towns, the sutler was the one source of tobacco, soap, and other comforts. The irregularity of payday made some type of credit necessary if the soldier was to enjoy these items. It was this situation that prompted Congress to restore the sutler's lien on pay. In the early stages of the war, it was optimistically expected that troops would soon be moving into enemy territory. "If there were no sutlers," inquired Representative F. P. Blair of Missouri, "how much" would a spool of cotton cost in Richmond?²⁶ On occasions the sutler served the army well. His credit enabled troops to purchase badly needed clothing when the army supply system proved inadequate; his supply of green vegetables, for unexplained reasons not obtainable by the commissary, prevented scurvy.²⁷

¹⁹General Orders No. 105, Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, December 11, 1863, in *Official Records, War of the Rebellion*, 1st series, XL, pt. 3, 156.

²⁰New York *Herald*, December 16, 1861.

²¹*Ibid.*, December 12, 1861.

²²*Ibid.*, February 1, 1862.

²³Later an allotment system was established.

²⁴General Orders of the War Department . . . 1861, 1862, & 1863, I, 219.

²⁵*Ibid.*, II, 26-27.

²⁶Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 1146.

²⁷Official Records, War of the Rebellion, 2d series, VIII, 145.

Nor was the sutler's life always pleasant. If his prices were high, his risks were great. His most profitable merchandise was perishable and had to be sold quickly. He was often forced to move with great haste and leave some of his supplies. On tactical moves, he was required to remain in the rear while his customers moved forward. His stores were considered fair game by the troops, and he was robbed and cheated whenever opportunity presented itself. On the march the troops often made a sudden raid on the sutler's wagon, overturned it, stole his goods, and scattered. At least one sutler was forced to flee camp to escape lynching.²⁸ Any devilish trick aimed at "soaking the sutler" brought to the originator the high approbation of his companions. His wares were also a prime target of opportunity for hungry Confederate raiders. The paucity of men, money, and supplies in the South occasioned the disappearance of sutlers from most Confederate units after the first few months of the war, and the knowledge of concentrated stocks of food in a Union camp, however unpalatable, added zest and zeal to rebel attacks. The effectiveness of Mosby's raids on sutlers' trains prompted the Army of the Potomac in 1863 to supply armed escorts for the movement of goods to camps.²⁹ In the light of these perils, the high prices of the sutler, if not forgiven, are more easily understood.

The high military command was conscious of the contribution of the sutler to the soldier's morale. General Grant ordered all purveyors to the rear when he crossed the Rapidan in May, 1864. Two months later General Meade noted that the order had never been rescinded. In spite of logistical difficulties involved in permitting sutlers to

rejoin the troops, Meade felt that they should be allowed to do so since they had "many articles" for "the men's comfort."³⁰ In his absence, the sutler's contributions were missed.

All the ramifications of the sutler problem were aired in Congress in the early months of 1862. It soon became apparent that no one liked the sutler but that no one knew what to do about him. The Congressional attempt to create changes in his status was met by an active, well-financed campaign by the sutlers and the commercial agents who supplied them with goods. Each regimental sutler was assessed twenty-five dollars for a fund to fight restrictive legislation and petitions from soldiers protesting against any change were hurriedly prepared and forwarded to members of Congress.³¹ Senator Henry Wilson of Massachusetts, chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, claimed that he was slandered, abused, and threatened with violence.³² Whether this spirited lobby influenced the failure of Congress to abolish sutlering is a moot point. From the arguments in both House and Senate, it seemed that the strongest support of the sutler came not from any pressure group but from the laissez-faire spirit of the age. Price controls and rigid regulation of legitimate (*sic*) commercial enterprises were not elements in the economic thinking of legislators in 1862. Furthermore, there was not yet a full realization by the American people that the war was to be a long and bloody contest, and the personal and private welfare of the soldier was not yet considered a prime aim of the government.

Senator Wilson introduced a bill allowing sutlers to continue to operate under certain regulations. He planned to create a system similar to that employed by the Navy in which men on shipboard purchased needed

²⁸Diary of G. L. Griscom, in Bell Irvin Wiley, *Life of Johnny Reb* (Indianapolis, 1943), p. 100.

²⁹Provost Marshal General to Deputy Provost Marshal General, August 13, 1863, in *Official Records, War of the Rebellion*, 1st series, XXIX, Pt. 2, 40-41.

³⁰Meade to Grant, July 8, 1864, *ibid.*, 1st series, XI, Pt. 3, 73.

³¹*Congressional Globe*, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 68-69.

³²*Ibid.*, p. 272.

articles from an establishment operated by the command.³³ Commissary and quartermaster officers brought to Wilson's attention the obvious administrative differences between serving one thousand men on one ship and tens of thousands of widely-scattered and oft-moving troops.³⁴ The unwieldy and already-overtaxed army accounting and purchasing agencies would be further harassed if they were forced to issue "five cents' worth of thread" or "five cents' worth of tobacco."³⁵ To such observations Representative Blair added cynically: The quartermaster "is just as likely to cheat" the soldier as the sutler.³⁶ Most Congressmen agreed that the soldier should have access to tobacco and a few other articles, but virtually no one was willing to put the government into the business of supplying them.

There was discussion over the monopolistic nature of the sutler's position. "Why should the sutler have a preëmption upon the pay of the soldier over and above the merchant and others who sell to the soldier?" asked Representative Campbell of Pennsylvania. Is he entitled to immunities above the crossroads trader who sells better for less? "With a dollar or two in his pocket the soldier can supply himself cheaply with everything that he wants." "Let the whole traffic be thrown open for fair competition. . . ."³⁷ Mr. Campbell's oratorical efforts were to little avail since most Congressmen visualized the confusion and complete absence of control if every hawker were permitted to sell commodities in army camps.

The law of supply and demand also was invoked on behalf of the sutler. If the lien on pay were taken away, the sutler's risks would increase and he would be forced to

raise prices. It was also argued that the removal of a guarantee of payment would give a bonus to those soldiers who did not pay their debts and force honest officers and men to pay higher prices. Conversely—so ran the argument—assured payment would tend to lower prices. The opinion, common at the time, that the soldier was better off without any money since it only encouraged him to get into trouble was also expressed by certain Congressmen.³⁸

The quartermaster organization was inadequate to take over the sutler's tasks; free competition promised additional abuses; the only alternative that remained was a well-regulated sutler. And such was the result of the Congressional labors. The lien on pay remained but could be granted only up to one-fourth of the soldier's pay and but one-sixth could be collected at the pay table. To do away with the prevalent connivance between officers and sutlers, the appointing power was disassociated from the price-fixing power. All the commissioned officers of a regiment named the sutler, but prices were fixed by a group of brigade officers.³⁹ Although this action was desirable to prevent corruption, it resulted in different price levels for each brigade and led to considerable confusion. The articles offered for sale by the sutler were limited to a specific list but a board of inspectors-general could add any items deemed necessary for the welfare of the troops.⁴⁰ The act also specified that each

³³*Ibid.*,

³⁹*United States Statutes at Large*, XII, 371-73.

³⁴*Ibid.* It was estimated that it would cost one million dollars annually to have the quartermaster issue these items.

³⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 1144-45.

³⁶*Ibid.*, p. 1144.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 1145.

⁴⁰The original list was as follows: apples, dried apples, oranges, figs, lemons, butter, cheese, milk, syrup, molasses, raisins, candles, crackers, wallets, brooms, comforters, boots, brass buttons, newspapers, books, tobacco, cigars, pipes, matches, blacking, brushes of all kinds, combs, emery, crocus, handkerchiefs, stationery, armor oil, sweet oil, rotten stone, razor strops, razors, shaving soap, soap, suspenders, scissors, shoe strings, needles, thread, knives, pencils, and Bristol brick. The board later added: canned meats, oysters, dried beef, smoked tongue, canned and fresh vegetables, pepper, mustard, yeast powders, pickles, sardines, eggs, buckwheat flour, poultry, tin utensils, uniform clothing for officers, shoes, shirts, and drawers.

sutlering establishment be inspected every fifteen days.

This legislation became law on March 20, 1862. It applied only to the Volunteer Army, and its success or failure varied directly with the energy expended by individual officers in enforcing it. Whether the law was responsible for the appreciable improvement is a matter of conjecture. More likely the growing feeling that a long war was in prospect brought public pressure to bear on the military to see that the soldier's interests were protected. The gradual development of a competent fighting force with more efficient administrative and logistical support made it more difficult for the sutler to violate regulations. As the war deepened, the luxury of graft and "chiseling" was no longer tolerated.

Most accounts written by soldiers are venomous in their condemnation of the sutler, but a few conclude that his influence was not entirely evil, for, according to one diarist,

"we were glad enough to be within reach of him, whatever he charged."⁴¹ And another adds: "Who cares if condensed milk was a dollar a can and pickles a dollar a bottle? The goods were better to us than the dollars were—when we had them."⁴²

What happened to the institution of sutlering? Post-war reaction resulted in abolition in 1867, but nine years later Congress authorized "post traders" who had remarkably similar duties to the sutler of war days and who were called by this name in Western posts. It was not until 1893 that these "traders" were abolished and co-operative canteens established. These marked the faint beginnings of the post-exchange system which gradually developed until it reached full fruition in World War II.

⁴¹Bardeen, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴²Charles E. Benton, *As Seen from the Ranks—A Boy in the Civil War* (New York and London, 1902), p. 17.

ARMED FORCES WRITERS' LEAGUE

Now well along, the Armed Forces Writers' League is a new national organization aimed at bringing together all service connected personnel interested in producing creative material for publication. Anyone interested may obtain detailed information from the national secretary, R. S. Ewing, 3542 N. Utah St., Arlington, Virginia. Local Washington meetings are held at Ft. Myer, Virginia.

THE LAST OF THE ARMY MULES

A scant half a dozen years ago old timers mourned the statutory demise of the Cavalry and of the Coast Artillery. "Time marches on." Now cometh the turn of the Army mule. At Ft. Carson, Colorado, on 14 February 1957, the last two Army mule pack outfits were sold, a total of 136 faithful quadrupeds. At a formal ceremony, 16 December 1956, the 4th Field Artillery (Pack)

and the 35th Quartermaster Pack Company, the last pack outfits in the U. S. Army, were retired. It is difficult to grasp the speed with which we are moving into the new weapons-system era.

CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL BILL

A bill to establish a Civil War Centennial Commission was co-sponsored by two Northern and two Southern senators in January 1957 and subsequently passed. Senators Bricker of Ohio, Martin of Pennsylvania, Robertson of Virginia, and Thurmond of South Carolina, the co-sponsors, designated 1961 as "Civil War Centennial Year," to commemorate the innumerable instances of valor, sacrifice, and devotion that marked that tragic conflict, and to recognize again the profound influence of the Civil War in making the United States a truly national entity and the most powerful in the world. (For a related item, see page 222.)

ELBA INTERLUDE, JUNE 1944

BY SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON*

ROME fell to the Allies on 4 June 1944 and the Germans retreated to a line from Capo d'Uomo in the Tyrrhenian Sea to Pescara in the Adriatic, along which they made a stand for about ten days. This seemed to General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson the proper time to launch a minor amphibious operation which had been hanging in the bight for over six months—the capture of the island of Elba. It turned out to be an interesting and rather bloody little affair which nearly failed for want of sufficient naval gunfire support.¹

Elba, famous for having served as Napoleon's principality in 1814-15, lies only five miles from the Italian coast across the Piombino Channel, and only 28 miles from Bastia, Corsica.

The desire to take it originated with the French Army of Liberation, impatient for

more action after liberating Corsica in September 1943. The concept, dropped when Anzio came up because neither ships nor men could then be spared, was revived by General Wilson in February 1944 in order to cut German coastal traffic. Again it was postponed, but was finally restored to the operations timetable at the urgent request of the Fighting French who wanted immediate employment for their idle troops in Corsica.

Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, if left to his own devices, would have evacuated Elba by mid-June 1944, when the Allies broke through his left flank to Grosseto, 30 miles due east of the island; and the German Naval Command Italy then had enough boats to transport every soldier from Elba to the mainland in one night. On the 13th Kesselring requested permission to do so from Hitler, who, to his dismay, replied "Elba is not to be evacuated but held," to which General Alfred Jodl added "to the last man and the last cartridge"—a favorite Hitlerian order. For, as the *Fuehrer* graciously explained, Elba protected his "Gothic Line" across Italy from Spezia to Pesaro. In view of Elba's position relative to Spezia this explanation is not convincing; in reality the holding of Elba was another instance of Hitler's *Inselnwahn* ("island madness"), like holding the Channel Islands. Supplies for the garrison for two months were on hand, and it looked as if the capture of Elba would require a long siege.

Hitler's only concession was to allow his troops on the Pianosa islet, seven miles south

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¹Général Jean de Cattre de Tassigny (trans. Barnes), *Histoire de la Première Armée Française* (Paris 1949; London, 1952), chap. ii, has an heroic account of this operation. See also Rear Admiral T. H. Troubridge, "Operation Against Elba, Lessons Learnt," 29 June 1944; Lt. Cdr. B. H. Griswold III, USNR (Admiral Hewitt's observer), "Report on Operation BRASSARD," with a timetable of the operation; German Naval Command Italy War Diary for June 1944 (trans. Div. of Naval History); Beach Jumper Unit No. 5 (Lt. Cdr. A. L. Williams), Action Report 20 June; Senior LST Officer (Lt. Cdr. Charles H. Johnson), Action Report; Action Reports of U.S.S. "Tattall," "LCI-45," "LST-210," "LST-352," and LCT Type Commander.

of Elba, to be moved to the larger island.²

As it turned out, the German fight for the island did them no good; and the Allies might well have by-passed Elba for all the good it did them.

Operation BRASSARD, the code name for the capture of this island, was given a mid-June D-day by Allied headquarters in Italy. Rear Admiral Thomas Troubridge, Royal Navy, the portly, vigorous, and genial flag officer who had distinguished himself in Sicily and Italy,³ was appointed the naval commander. *Général* Henry-Martin commanded the troops, some 12,000 in number, all French or French colonial. His force consisted of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division (*Général de Brigade* Magnan) composed of Senegalese and Goumiers, a volunteer *Bataillon de Choc*, a group of Moroccan Tabors, and an African commando group.⁴

The British planners estimated that, for a shore-to-shore operation from nearby Corsica, only beaching craft were needed for troop-lift. About one-fifth of the total (4 LSTs, 20 LCTs and 19 LCIs) was allotted by Admiral H. Kent Hewitt from his VIII Amphibious Force—reluctantly, as they should have been training for DRAGOON. Owing to the chronic shortage of these vessels in the Mediterranean, some of the troops were lifted from Corsica to Elba in landing craft towed by British motor launches. Admiral Troubridge's command ship was H.M.S. "LCH-282," an LCI converted to a Landing Craft, Headquarters. Three U.S.N. motor torpedo-boat squadrons—15, 22, and 29—all under Lieutenant Commander Stanley M. Barnes, also became an integral part

of this assault.

Elba is a rugged little island about 30 miles long with three deep bays on the south coast and two on the north. At the head of the bays there is intensively cultivated, level, arable land, above which rocky mountains rise to a height of over 3,300 feet at the western end and 1,700 feet at the eastern. Practicable landing beaches are few in number. The best (then designated Amber and Red) are on Golfo di Campo, westernmost of the three bays on the south shore; from them it is only four miles by a good road across the island to Golfo di Procchio, whence another road leads easterly to Porto Ferraio, the capital. Unfortunately these beaches, like all others, are dominated by mountains on whose flanks the Germans had numerous weapons.

Since reconnaissance planes had spotted extensive minefields in the shoal waters that extend south of Elba,⁵ the planners of this operation did not care to risk exposing destroyers or light cruisers to them. Moreover, owing to an Intelligence underestimate of the strength and character of the garrison,⁶ it was not thought necessary to provide heavy naval gunfire support. For gunfire support the landing force was furnished with three antique British river gunboats, H.M.S. "Cockchafer," "Aphis," and "Scarab," whose largest guns were 6-inch, and five British LCG (Landing Craft, Gun), whose main battery was 4.7-inch. Two United States destroyer transports, "Tattnall" and "Roper," were in the BRASSARD force; but their mission was to land troops on Pianosa, and patrol against submarines.

²Pianosa had been raided from Corsica on the night of 16-17 March by a French commando unit with a detachment of U.S. Rangers, lifted in two British MTBs and one PT; 38 prisoners were taken. Col. Bouvet (who commanded the troops), *Ouvriers de la première heure* (Paris 1954) pp. 59-61.

³See Samuel Eliot Morison, *Sicily-Salerno-Anzio* (Boston, 1954), pp. 149-62, 333-45.

⁴De Lattre de Tassigny, *op.cit.*, p. 38.

⁵This aerial spotting, an experiment made at the request of a South African in the Royal Navy, was so successful that similar air-spotting of mines was incorporated in the DRAGOON plan.

⁶The estimate was 900, according to a statement by Lt. Cdr. Douglas E. Fairbanks, USNR, immediately after the operation; De Lattre de Tassigny *op.cit.*, p. 36 says 1,500. The correct figure was about 3,000, mostly Germans, but including some Italian units which the Germans, as usual, reported to be more hindrance than help.

This motley flotilla of over 200 ships and small craft departed in four sections from Porto Vecchio, Ajaccio, and Bastia in Corsica, and from La Maddalena in Sardinia, at various times on 16 June. Air cover was provided by the 87th Fighter Wing (Colonel T. C. Darcy, USA) based near Bastia; and on the night of 16-17 June 26 R.A.F. Wellingtons bombed Porto Ferraio and Porto Longone.⁷

The sun sank from a cloudless sky into a perfectly calm sea at 2100. Well before that time any sharp-eyed lookout on the high western promontory of Elba could have sighted a large part of the flotilla and guessed what was going to happen late that night.

At 2300 June 16, "PT-210" disembarked members of the French *Bataillon de Choc* in rubber folboats off Capo di Poro on the south coast of Elba; on retiring she was spotted by two German F-lighters which opened 88-mm. gunfire, but escaped. The French commandos were supposed to sneak up on German batteries and take them from the rear before the main landings began. Another and larger group was landed by five American PTs on the north side of the island, in the hope of convincing the enemy that the main attack would be in the south; but the only effect of these commando landings was to alert the enemy and cause him to get ready a supply of ammunition and pyrotechnics. One of the French units, however, had the satisfaction of seizing Napoleon's former villa from which the German island commander, *Generalleutnant* Valentin Gall, had just decamped.

Minecraft as usual were in the van of the main assault; eight fleet minesweepers of the Royal Navy and four British YMSs manned by Greek sailors cleared a channel from a point south of Pianosa into Golfo di Campo,

where the two fairly good beaches (Amber and Red) and a tiny one (Green) under the mountain had been selected for the landings.

At 0245 June 17 the first waves of LCVPs from the American LTSs were on their way in to the Golfo di Campo beaches, flanked by British LCGs for close-fire support. Flares dropped by the air-support Wellingtons, searching for their bombing targets, inexpediently illuminated the blacked-out ships and craft, and the Germans coöperated with "the most brilliant flares observed in any action" so far in the Mediterranean.⁸

Thus revealed to the enemy, the first boat wave to Beach Green attracted shelling and machine-gun fire, fortunately very inaccurate, but so heavy that Lieutenant (jg) D. C. Wetmore USNR, the boat-wave commander, abandoned the slow approach called for in his operations plan, ordered the underwater exhausts cut off, and full speed to the beach, which they hit hard and accurately.⁹ By a miracle none was killed before landing at that hot little corner of the Gulf, but everyone was appalled by the ferocity of the firing. Lieutenant Commander Johnson, senior LST officer, called it "the greatest amount of close-in beach defense" he had seen, and he had been in the assaults at Casablanca, Licata, Salerno, and Anzio. "The Gulf was literally covered with tracers of enemy gunfire. Guns from about .30-caliber to 20-mm were used, and probably even 80-mm, according to later evidence." A landing-craft wave leader who had been in all four earlier landings said that the "efficient and courageous action" of officers and men under enemy fire surpassed all expectations. Johnson also described the gunfire and rocket support furnished by

⁷Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate (eds.), *Army Air Forces in World War II* (6 vols; Chicago, 1948-1955), III, 400.

⁸"LST-4" Action Report 20 June 1944. The flare-dropping planes were identified as A.A.F. B-25s, but Dr. A. F. Simpson, the Air Force historian, informs me that the only B-25s that got anywhere near Elba took off from Corsica at 1130 June 17 and turned back owing to solid overcast.

⁹Lt. (jg) Wetmore Action Report enclosed in "LST-352" Action Report 18 June 1944.

British escorts as "magnificent" and "probably the chief reason why landings could be made at all." Rockets were launched "exactly on schedule," and served to damp down enemy fire "for a vital few minutes while the boats actually touched down."

Boat waves headed for Beaches Amber and Red on the other side of the Gulf received an equally hot reception, since the commandos who had landed before midnight on Capo Poro had not managed to silence the overhanging German batteries. The entire Gulf became lighter than day and noisier than an old-fashioned Fourth of July. A waning last-quarter moon rose at 0340 on as lively a scene as she had witnessed in the Mediterranean since the last air raid on Anzio. A German F-lighter, lying alongside the môle at the little town of Marina di Campo, was boarded and captured in good old pistol-and-cutlass style by the sailors of two British small craft.

"Group 4" of the assault, 9 British and 19 American LCIs filled with French troops, were waiting for the word to move in to Beaches Amber and Red. At 0432 "SNOL" (Senior Naval Officer Landing, Captain Errol C. L. Turner Royal Navy in "LCH-315") signals to Admiral Troubridge: "Resistance on beaches appears overcome, Cape Poro silenced." In they start, but the Cape Poro battery promptly comes to life. Two British LCIs at 0445 take direct hits, one in a magazine; both start exploding and burning. "LCH-315" sends word: "Two LCI burning fiercely—send fire-fighter immediately." One LCI, specially equipped as a hospital ship, is lost with all hands; a second ("LCI-132") takes a direct hit but is saved by U.S.S. "LCI-190," fitted as a fire-fighter. At 0500 the Beach Red beachmaster reports "no LCI have been landed. Situation serious." Admiral Troubridge directs SNOL to ask Red beachmaster's advice on best beach for LCIs to land. The reply is "regret beachmaster out of action from mortar fire." Cap-

tain Turner makes the decision himself, orders the two beaches in the Gulf (Red and Amber) to be closed down immediately, and all LCIs to head for Beach Green.

It looked from offshore as if the flotilla had steamed into a bloody trap. The enemy was pouring gunfire into Golfo di Campo from three sides. Could anyone get out alive?

Shifting the landing to Beach Green saved lives but slowed the operational tempo. This beach, only 170 yards long, had no proper vehicle exits and no beach organization, since it was to have been used only for the first assault boat waves. The LCIs came in notwithstanding, some beaching and others standing close offshore to be unloaded by LCAs and the weary LCVPs. After 0540, when the sun rose, Captain Turner ordered British LCMs equipped with smoke blowers to conceal the beaches from the enemy. When troops ashore demanded ammunition, Captain Turner sent three LCTs loaded with pack mules carrying small-arms ammunition right in to Red and Amber beaches. He found a comparatively sheltered nook for his "LCH-315" under a cliff where enemy fire could not reach him, and thence directed movements of ships and landing craft. One of the stricken British LCIs managed to retract and close U.S.S. "LST-352," one of whose junior officers thus describes the appalling condition of a beaching craft after being hit by four 88-mm. shells while disembarking troops:

Great holes gaped in her sides and her well deck was a mass of wrecked material, still and twisted bodies of the dead, and the bleeding, mangled bodies of the wounded. . . . The only living figure not shattered by shrapnel was a black-as-night medic who was stolidly patching up the hurt. . . . Officers and men of the LCI were themselves in a daze and able to offer us little help in getting the wounded aboard our ship. With two pharmacist's mates and several crew members I climbed down a cargo net to the deck of the LCI and began the work of lifting the men to our ship in stretchers. It was

slow and ghastly business. Although partially bandaged with hastily applied battle bandages, none of the wounded had been given morphine. Our pharmacist's mates had to give each of the living a pain-deadening shot in the arm before he could begin to lift them. . . . We slipped on the blood-covered deck and trod on the still shapes of those beyond saving. No one cried or whimpered. The stoical black soldiers accepted pain as they accepted our ministrations in silence. . . . Altogether we carried seven aboard, helped four others with lesser wounds up a ladder. On our deck a hatch cover had been transformed into a receiving station and the ship's doctor was already busy at work dressing wounds. . . . The three most seriously wounded men, including one French army officer, died before nightfall. The others we sent ashore today after a station hospital had been set up on the beachhead.¹⁰

By 0710 Captain Turner reported that all LCIs had unloaded troops, and by noon the beachheads were joined up and extended three to six miles inland. Only one battery was still giving trouble. The rest of the LCIs were now ordered in to Beaches Red and Amber. Intermittent gunfire did not deter their vehicles from rolling ashore. In the meantime the wind had changed and a heavy overcast rolled over Elba, so that air bomber support, requested from Corsica, could do nothing.

After the last LCTs and LSTs were unloaded on 18 June the naval assault mission was considered complete. Some 11,000 French troops, 465 vehicles, 86 guns, 10 tanks and 250 mules had been landed. They went into action immediately, first capturing the coastal batteries. By the close of D-day plus one, most of the island was in French hands, and on the morning of the 19th the surrender of Porto Longone on the east coast marked the end of organized German resistance.

On the night of 19-20 June a German naval evacuation unit from Piombino, com-

manded by *Korvettenkapitän* Wehrmann, arrived off the northeast coast to evacuate a remnant of the garrison, which was waiting for them on the rocky shore. Hitler's permission to do this had been obtained only that day at 1508, and the four F-lighters and two Siebel ferries did not leave Piombino until 2130. On its return passage to the mainland, Wehrmann's unit was attacked by PTs and gunboats, and lost one F-lighter, but managed to carry out 400 evacuees, including the island commandant, to Leghorn. About 2,000 troops had already been taken prisoner and several hundred had been killed. Thus, the strength of the island garrison proved to be over double that of the highest Intelligence estimate.¹¹

In the meantime the landing on Pianosa, seven miles to the southward, had been a push-over, for the good reason that the German garrison had already left. The French officers, who had worked out an elaborate night-landing plan, were disappointed.

Operation BRASSARD was not without value. The French *Goumiers* had some valuable practice in their favorite outdoor sport of hunting "Boches," and the British, who had planned the operation, received another proof of the need for naval gunfire support even in a minor landing. As Admiral Troubridge reported: "Where, as in the operation against Elba, the initial assault wave fails to overcome the beach defenses, further exploitation without adequate gunfire support is not a practical proposition. Even had this support been available it is doubtful whether the guns, mounted in artificial caves in the cliff faces covering the beaches, would have been neutralized, at any rate in the dark. Yet the beach must be captured before the operation can be properly developed."

U.S.S. "Tattnall" and "Roper," after landing French troops easily on Pianosa,

¹⁰Ens. George A. Hough, USNR, "Germans Not Surprised in Assault on Elba," *Edgartown (Mass.) Vineyard Gazette*, 7 July 1944.

¹¹German Naval Command Italy War Diary, pp. 9-12 of translation.

might have been summoned to help at Elba, but they had been assigned to anti-submarine patrol, as were two British Hunt-class destroyers northeast of Elba. Admiral Troubridge very properly did not care to risk them in the mine-strewn waters south of Elba, and the swept channels were too narrow for them. The three gunboats and four LCGs, despite antiquated systems of fire control, made some good hits, which were more effective than the air bombing. Air participation was difficult to obtain—it took as much as two hours to get calls through to the Bastia

airdrome, less than 30 miles distant—and haphazard at best.

BRASSARD was rather costly for so unimportant an operation. The French Army lost 252 killed or missing and had 635 wounded. The U.S. Navy lost only three sailors but the Royal Navy, in addition to the LCI burned with all hands, lost a flakship and 30 of her crew by a mine explosion, and about a dozen landing craft. The only tangible benefit from taking Elba was to facilitate inshore patrol by the motor torpedo boats based at Bastia.

ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMI AND THE AHA IN NEW YORK

The annual joint meeting of the American Military Institute and the American Historical Association was held at 10:00 a.m., Saturday, 28 December 1957, in the West Room of the Hotel Statler in New York before an overflow crowd of two hundred persons. The session, under the chairmanship of President James Phinney Baxter, 3rd, of Williams College, dealt with "The President as Commander-in-Chief: Coalition Warfare in the Twentieth Century." It consisted of papers by Professor Ernest R. May of Harvard University, "Woodrow Wilson as Commander-in-Chief in World War I," and Professor William R. Emerson of Yale University, "Franklin D. Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief in World War II," with comments by Maurice Matloff of the Office of the Chief of Military History and Walter Millis of the Fund for the Republic. It is hoped that the papers can be published in a later issue of *Military Affairs*.

Mr. May's excellent paper pointed out Wilson's conscious effort to escape the responsibilities of commander-in-chief whenever possible and his abdication of those responsibilities to his military commanders, particularly General Pershing. Mr. Emer-

son's paper ably contrasted the extreme degree to which Franklin Roosevelt assumed the powers and responsibilities of commander-in-chief and his expansion of these powers.

Mr. Emerson's paper provoked by far the greatest amount of comment. This was undoubtedly a result of both the greater interest in World War II and the complexities of the Rooseveltian character. Mr. Matloff found a number of points to challenge, particularly the relationship between President Roosevelt and his chiefs of staff. It struck this listener, however, that in most of these Mr. Matloff was not discussing the same matters as Mr. Emerson. Mr. Millis' comments tended to reinforce the positions of the two papers and he left the meeting to mull over the proposition that "to Wilson war was an instrument of policy, while to Roosevelt policy was an instrument of war." As usual, the comments from the floor were numerous and pointed.

To this listener the session was one of the best he has attended at any AMI or AHA meeting, a conclusion that was echoed by many of the other listeners with whom he talked.—KJB

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NOTES AND ANTIQUITIES

FEDERAL BATTERIES ON THE HENRY HOUSE HILL, BULL RUN, 1861

By RALPH W. DONNELLY

At the outbreak of the American Civil War there was every reason for the North to look forward to superiority of Federal artillery over that of the South. First, the organizations in the Federal Army were regular units with all the superiority that training, *esprit de corps*, and continuity of organizational existence engenders. On the other hand the Confederate units, with the notable exception of the Washington Artillery of New Orleans, were hastily organized volunteer units. Second, the matériel of the Federal batteries was the best available in either army; and third, the Federal batteries entered the first engagements under experienced officers or officers recently graduated from West Point.

Cavalry was not a factor at the outset in the Virginia theatre, and the infantry on both sides was basically volunteer or militia. The Federal Army at Bull Run had a composite battalion of Regular infantry which did notable service. The U. S. Marine contingent, normally considered "Regulars," was composed largely of new recruits. These two units together were but a small segment of the Federal Army, and the character of the infantry as a whole was volunteer. It was in the artillery that the Federal superiority was to be expected.

At the battle of Bull Run (or Manassas) on July 21, 1861, authorities and students

generally agree, the key tactical movement was that of Griffin's "West Point" and Ricketts' Regular Army batteries to the Henry House Hill. What actually transpired there makes for an interesting investigation.

* * * * *

The Federal artillery sent forward to the Henry hill or plateau consisted of Captain Charles Griffin's Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, and Captain James B. Ricketts' Battery I, First U. S. Artillery.

On July 1, three weeks before the battle, Captain Griffin's battery consisted of 109 enlisted men and five officers, but only 65 men and three officers (Griffin, First Lieutenant Adelbert Ames, and Second Lieutenant Samuel N. Benjamin) were actually present for duty. The battery on this date had 102 serviceable horses.¹

Captain James B. Ricketts on June 30, 1861, at Alexandria, Virginia, reported 66 enlisted men and three officers (Ricketts, First Lieutenant Douglas Ramsay, and Second Lieutenant William A. Elderkin) present for duty out of an aggregate battery strength of 77 officers and men.² Attached to this battery was a detail of 48 men under

¹Muster Roll for May-June, 1861, Battery D, 5th U. S. Regt. Arty., Capt. C. Griffin, comdg., U. S. National Archives.

²Muster Roll for May-June, 1861, Battery I, 1st U. S. Regt. Arty., Capt. James B. Ricketts, comdg., U. S. National Archives.

Second Lieutenant Edmund Kirby.³ Thus the battery actually consisted of 114 enlisted men and four officers. On June 30 the battery had 107 serviceable horses.⁴

It is not clear from the muster rolls as to how many men went into action on July 21 with each battery, but Griffin's battle report says he took 95 men on the field,⁵ and the presumption is that Ricketts probably had about the same number present.

It has been quite customary to say that the Regular Army batteries of Griffin and Ricketts were "wiped out," and the impression is conveyed that virtually all the horses and men were killed or disabled. For example, the National Park Service claims that "suddenly the regiment [33d Virginia] delivered a murderous volley which killed most of the horses and men of both batteries. . . ."⁶ Another recent source states that ". . . the 33rd Virginia . . . fired a volley which killed or wounded 54 officers and men and 104 horses; and in an instant put both batteries out of action."⁷

Earlier observations, which the passage of time indicates were more graphic, sensational, and imaginative than warranted, have colored historical writing on this point for over ninety years. A Federal officer, William W. Averell, in testifying before the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, gave this vivid picture:

³Muster Roll for May-June, 1861, of Men Attached to Battery I, 1st U. S. Regt. Art., 2nd Lt. Edmund Kirby, comdg., U. S. National Archives.

⁴Muster Roll for May-June, 1861, Battery I, 1st U. S. Regt. Art., Capt. James B. Ricketts, comdg., U. S. National Archives.

⁵U. S. War Dept., *The War of the Rebellion: Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (Washington, 1881-1901), Ser. I, Vol. 2, p. 394: report of Capt. Charles Griffin, 5th U. S. Art. This source is cited hereinafter as O.R. with Series I understood.

⁶Francis F. Wilshin, *Manassas (Bull Run)*, "National Park Historical Handbook Series," No. 15 [Washington, 1955], p. 14.

⁷Joseph Mills Hanson, *Bull Run Remembers* . . . (Manassas, Va., 1953), p. 6.

It seemed as though every man and horse of that battery just laid down and died right off. . . . The destruction of the battery was so complete that the marines and zouaves seemed to be struck with such astonishment, such consternation, that they could not do anything.⁸

Even more dramatic was the scene as described by the Federal soldier-writer, Warren Lee Goss, who presented this vivid picture to a receptive and credulous audience:

. . . a terrible volley was poured into them. . . . The Rebels had crept upon them unawares, and the men at the batteries were about all killed or wounded. The dead cannoneers lay with the rammers of the guns and sponges and lanyards still in their hands. The battery was annihilated by those volleys in a moment. Those who could get away didn't wait.⁹

Equally as dramatic, and imaginative, was John Nicolay's version:

But hardly had Ricketts taken his post, before his cannoneers and horses began to fall under the accurate fire of near and well-concealed Rebel sharpshooters. Death puffed from bushes, fences, buildings, and yet the jets of flame and wreaths of smoke were the only visible enemy to assail. Officers and cannoneers held on with desperate courage.

Nicolay then describes the approach of a Confederate infantry regiment which fired a volley at the batteries and ". . . in an instant the regiment's volley had annihilated Griffin's and Ricketts' batteries. Under this sudden catastrophe the supporting regiments stood spellbound. The unexpected disaster overawed them; . . ."¹⁰

⁸U. S. Congress, *Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War* (3 Pts.; Washington, 1863), Pt. II, p. 216: testimony of William W. Averell. This source is quoted in R. M. Johnston, *Bull Run, Its Strategy and Tactics* (Boston, 1913), p. 216.

⁹Otto Eisenschiml and Ralph Newman, *The American Iliad* (Indianapolis, 1947), p. 56, quoting Warren Lee Goss, *Recollections of a Private. A Story of the Army of the Potomac* (New York, 1890).

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 58, quoting John G. Nicolay, *The Outbreak of the Rebellion* ("Campaigns of the Civil War," Vol. I [New York, 1881]).

Now, let us take a look at the actual facts of the "annihilation" of Ricketts' and Griffin's batteries at the first battle of Bull Run.

First, what is the true story of Battery I, First U. S. Artillery, known as Ricketts' Battery? According to the muster roll dated August 31, 1861, the first made after the battle of Bull Run, First Lieutenant Douglas Ramsay, Sergeant John H. Willis, and eight privates were carried on the report as "killed on July 21, 1861," and Captain James B. Ricketts himself was a prisoner of war. Then the muster roll discloses various revisions and corrections added later by the Adjutant General's Office and the Pension Office which show that Sergeant J. H. Willis and Privates Burritt, Grant, Gray, Langdon, and Lewis had not been killed but were actually prisoners of war of the Confederates, and that Private Cullen returned to duty during the period of September-October, 1861. These corrections leave a net loss of Lieutenant Ramsay and two privates actually killed. Included in Ricketts' Battery was Lieutenant Edmund Kirby's detachment which reported four privates killed and seven wounded. Private Christian, originally reported killed, was later "taken up" on January 10, 1862, so that the net number killed was only three. So the two groups comprising Ricketts' Battery had a combined loss of Lieutenant Ramsay and five privates killed, Captain Ricketts, a sergeant, and five privates captured, six privates and an armorer wounded, and two privates missing.¹¹

This is a different picture from the report printed in the *Official Records* which gives 12 killed and 15 wounded.¹²

The muster roll for July-August, 1861, of Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, Griffin's

West Point Battery, originally reported a sergeant and seven privates killed at Bull Run, one private dead of wounds, two privates supposed to be mortally wounded, and First Lieutenant Adelbert Ames wounded.¹³ However, later corrections and amendments to the roll show that Sergeant Stephen Kane was actually not present during the battle and that Private Campbell (reported killed) and the two privates (Chambers R. Holliday and Joseph A. Howard) supposedly mortally wounded were actually prisoners of war and returned from Richmond the next summer.¹⁴ This revises the loss of the battery to six privates killed, one mortally wounded, one lieutenant (Ames) wounded, and three prisoners of war, an aggregate loss of eleven as contrasted with the 12 killed and 15 wounded (an aggregate of 27 casualties) originally reported.¹⁵

So the true combined casualty list of the two batteries was one lieutenant and 11 men killed, one man mortally wounded, a lieutenant, six privates, and an armorer wounded, and 10 privates captured or missing, a total loss of 31.

This now takes us to the next question, how many were present in the two batteries? Griffin's Battery D, Fifth U. S. Artillery, reportedly took a battery strength of 95 on the field.¹⁶ Ricketts' Battery proper had 77 officers and men on its muster roll for June 30, 1861, and Kirby's detachment consisted of 49 officers and men (excluding two sick) as of June 30, 1861. If all of these were present at the battle of Bull Run, then Ricketts had a total of 126 officers and men in his battery. The two batteries combined then entered the battle with over 200 officers

¹¹Muster Roll for July-August 1861, Battery I, 1st U. S. Regt. Arty., "Ricketts' Battery," and Muster Roll for July-August, 1861, of Detachment of Men under Lt. Kirby Attached to Battery I, 1st U. S. Arty., both in the U. S. National Archives.

¹²O.R. 51, Pt. 1, p. 18.

¹³Muster Roll for July-August, 1861, Battery D, 5th U. S. Regt. Arty., Griffin's Battery, U. S. National Archives.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵O.R. 51, Pt. 1, p. 18.

¹⁶O.R. 2, p. 394: report of Capt. Chas. Griffin, 5th U. S. Arty.

and men, and possibly as many as 221. With only 21 killed and wounded the batteries suffered about a 10 per cent loss, and adding the prisoners to the loss increases the percentage to about 15 per cent. The point is, *this was far from annihilation.*

Just a year later Pegram's Richmond Purcell Battery (Confederate) fought through the Battles of the Seven Days and suffered a reported loss of 60 officers and men out of about 80 present.¹⁷ Of these one officer and six men were killed, and two officers and 51 men were wounded.¹⁸ A loss of 47 men and many horses was reported at Mechanicsville alone.¹⁹ Even with a considerable error in these figures, it seems reasonable to suppose that the percentage of loss was much higher than that of Ricketts' and Griffin's Batteries a year earlier. Yet there does not seem to have been any particular attention paid in histories of the war to this battery's losses in the Battles of the Seven Days. The new element which seems to account for the difference of attitude is *time* and its corollary, *the public acceptance of war losses.*

There are other combat records of the Federal artillery which indicate that battery losses far heavier than at Bull Run were later accepted almost without comment. At Antietam in 1862 Captain Joseph B. Campbell's Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, suffered a loss of 40 officers and men, having nine men killed and one officer and 30 men wounded.²⁰ In addition, the battery lost 26 horses killed and seven wounded.²¹

The next year at Chancellorsville (May, 1863) Lieutenant Francis W. Seeley's Battery K of the Fourth U. S. Artillery took 120 men into action²² and had 45 casualties.

These included seven men killed and one officer and 37 men wounded.²³ As to animals, the battery lost 59 horses killed and disabled.²⁴

Three Federal batteries suffered heavy losses at Gettysburg in July, 1863. Battery B, Fourth U. S. Artillery, which has been cited for losses at Antietam, lost 36 men, including two men killed, two officers and 29 wounded, and three men captured or missing. Another regular battery, "A" of the Fourth U. S. Artillery, had 38 casualties, including one officer and five men killed and one officer and 31 men wounded. The third was a volunteer battery, Light Battery A, First Rhode Island, which had a casualty list of 32, including three men killed, one officer and 27 men wounded, and one man captured or missing.

While these figures from the *Official Records* have not been verified by an examination of the muster rolls, the losses are probably fairly accurate since in all except the Battle of Chancellorsville the Army to which these batteries belonged retained possession of the field.

The loss of horses by the Federal batteries on the Henry House Hill at Bull Run was probably militarily more significant. Griffin's Battery was missing 55 horses out of 101 after the battle, some 46 apparently being taken off the field.²⁵ Ricketts' loss was proportional, some 49 horses being left on the field and 56 being taken off.²⁶ Thus it can be seen that roughly half of the batteries' horsepower was incapacitated, theoretically cutting the batteries' mobility in half.

But the loss of the horses is only part of the story. The inability to rescue the guns and wheeled equipment of the batteries was

¹⁷O.R. 11, Pt. 2, p. 843: report of Brig. Gen. Charles W. Field, C.S.A.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 983.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 837.

²⁰O.R. 29, Pt. 1, p. 190.

²¹*Ibid.*, p. 229.

²²O.R. 25, Pt. 1, p. 490.

²³*Ibid.*, p. 179.

²⁴*Ibid.*, p. 490.

²⁵O.R. 2, p. 394: report of Capt. Chas. Griffin, 5th U. S. Arty.

²⁶*Ibid.*, p. 407: report of Lt. Edmund Kirby, 1st U. S. Arty.

due not so much to the loss of the horses as it was due to stationing the teams apart and to the immediate rear of the guns where they were subject to direct fire, and to the inability to use harness and other equipment that was entangled with the dead and wounded animals. Almost fourteen years later one of Ricketts' subalterns, Lieutenant W. A. Elderkin, attributed the loss of the batteries primarily to the flight of the supporting infantry and to the fact that the dead horses anchored the limbers to the field and the heavy fire prevented any limbering up of the batteries.²⁷ Here we seem to have the best available explanation for the loss of these Federal batteries. Even so, Griffin took off three pieces, but the heavy loss of horses and men [as he saw it] made it impossible to salvage more.²⁸

Now after some 95 years certain assumptions and revised conclusions are in order.

First, the actual loss of manpower in Ricketts' and Griffin's Batteries was only moderate, and the usual picture of almost complete annihilation must be abandoned as the product of imaginative minds which were journalistic and literary rather than historical by training.

Second, the loss of horses was heavy and contributed heavily to the Federal inability to salvage most of the guns and wheeled equipment.

Third, the popular conception of almost complete annihilation was accepted by the people of the North because of a natural

tendency to exaggerate disasters (as, indeed, the loss of the battle was exaggerated), because the civilian mind was not yet geared to war-time losses which it later accepted as the inevitable end product of war, and because of the emotional state of shock induced by a defeat, particularly after the myth of invincibility, even against overwhelming odds, which had been created by the recent war with Mexico. The story found ready takers among those who needed a simple and plausible explanation of the Federal defeat.

Fourth, it served the Federal propaganda cause more to allow this misconception to persist than to correct it. As accepted this misconception spurred the desire to avenge the defeat and probably helped stimulate the North to more intensive military preparations. From the Southern point of view the picture of "annihilation" has served to prove the desired picture of a decisive Southern victory.

The silencing of Ricketts' and Griffin's Batteries probably marked a decisive turning point in the battle of Bull Run, but let us think of it as the point at which the Federal will to fight and win gave out. Appalled by the swift succession of events leading to utter collapse, the popular mind has had presented to it, and accepted, the theory that the silencing of the Federal batteries was the major contributing "cause" of the Federal defeat. Naturally this "cause" was a more effective concept in its dramatic and magnified form.

Actually, this event was probably the first dramatic "effect" in a series of effects leading from the primary cause of defeat, the loss of the will to fight and win.

²⁷William L. Haskins, *The History of the First Regiment of Artillery* (Portland, Me., 1879), p. 505: communication from W. A. Elderkin dated Feb. 20, 1875.

²⁸O.R. 2, p. 394: report of Capt. Chas. Griffin, 5th U. S. Art'y.

FRIEDRICH ENGELS ON RIFLED CANNON

Edited by MORTON BORDEN

PART II (ARTICLES II-IV)

II¹

The French were, as we said in our preceding paper, the first to introduce rifled cannon into practical warfare. For five or six years past, two officers, Col. Tamisier and Lieut.-Col. (now Col.) Treuille de Beaulieu, had experimentalized on the subject by order of the Government, and the results arrived at were found satisfactory enough to warrant their being made the base of a reorganization of the French artillery immediately before the outbreak of the late Italian war. Without entering upon the history of the experiments, we will at once pass to a description of the system now adopted in the French artillery.

In accordance with that desire for unity so characteristic of the French, they adopted one caliber only for field artillery (the old French four-pounder bore of 85½ millimetres, or nearly 3½ inches), and one for siege artillery (the old 12-pounder of 120 millimetres, or 4¾ inches). All other guns, except mortars, are to be done away with. The material selected is generally the common gun-metal, but also cast-steel, in some cases. The guns are muzzle-loading, as the French experiments with breech-loaders gave no satisfaction. There are six grooves in each gun, 5 millimetres deep, and 16 mm. broad, of a rounded form; the pitch of the rifling appears to be but low, but there are no details known respecting it. The windage on the body of

the shot is about ½ to 1 mm.; that on the *ailettes* or warts which enter the grooves rather less than 1 mm. The shot is cylindro-ogival, and hollow, weighing about 12 pounds when filled; it has six *ailettes*, one for every groove, three standing near the point, and three near the base; they are very short—about 15 mm. long. The fuse-hole passes downward from the point, and is closed by a fuse or by a pistol, with a percussion-cap for shot filled with powder, and by an iron screw, when the shot is not to explode; in this latter case it is filled with a mixture of sawdust and sand, so as to give it the same weight as when filled with powder. The length of bore of the gun is 1,385 mm., or 16 times its diameter; the weight of the brass gun is but 237 kilogrammes (518 pounds). To regulate the line of aim by the deviation (lateral deflection) of the shot in the direction of the pitch of the rifling—a deviation common to all projectiles launched from rifled barrels—the right trunnion carries what is called a horizontal tangent-scale. The gun, as well as its carriage, is reported to be of very elegant workmanship, and, from its small size and neatness, to look more like a model than a real engine of war.

Armed with this gun, the French artillery entered upon the Italian campaign, where it indeed astonished the Austrians by its great range, but certainly not by its accuracy of fire. The guns very often, indeed generally, overshot the mark, and were more dangerous to reserves than to first lines—in other words, where they hit better than the common guns, they hit people at whom they were not aimed at all. This is certainly a very questionable

* Part I, an introduction and Engels' first article in his series of four articles, was reprinted in *Military Affairs*, XXI (Summer 1957), 75-77. Dr. Borden, the editor of this series, is now on the history faculty at Montana State University, Missoula.

¹ New York *Tribune*, April 21, 1860.

advantage, as in nine cases out of ten it implies that the objects at which the guns were aimed were *not* hit. The Austrian artillery, with as clumsy a material as any in Europe, made a very decent appearance when opposed to them, and came up to close quarters (that is, 500 or 900 yards) with these formidable opponents, unlimbering under their most effective fire. There is no doubt that, great as the superiority of the new French guns is over their old smooth-bored ones, they did not perform anything like what was expected from them. Their extreme practicable range was 4,000 metres (4,400 yards), and undoubtedly it was but an impudent Bonapartist exaggeration when it was said that they could easily hit a single horseman at 3,300 yards.

The reasons for these unsatisfactory performances, in actual war, are very simple. The construction of these guns is utterly imperfect, and if the French adhere to it, in two or three years their artillery will possess the worst material in Europe. The first principle in rifled arms is that there must be *no windage*; otherwise the shot, loosely rolling about in the barrel and grooves, will not rotate round its own longitudinal axis, but rotate, in a spiral line of flight, round an imaginary line, the direction of which is determined by the accidental position of the shot when leaving the muzzle, and the spiral rounds will increase in diameter with the distance. Now, the French guns have considerable windage, and cannot do without it so long as the explosion of the charge is relied upon to light the fuse of the shell. This, then, is one circumstance which explains the want of accuracy. The second is the irregularity of the propelling force created by the greater or less escape of gas through windage during the explosion of the charge. The third is the greater elevation, with the same charge, necessitated through this windage; it stands to reason that where no gas at all can escape between shot

and bore, the same charge propels further than where part of the gas escapes. Now, the French guns appear to require not only a very great charge for rifled guns (one-fifth of the weight of the shot), but also a pretty high elevation. The greater range obtained by rifled bores over smooth ones, even with smaller charges, is chiefly obtained by the absence of windage, and the certainty of having the whole explosive force of the charge applied to the expulsion of the shot. By admitting windage, the French sacrifice part of the propelling force, and have to replace it by increased charges to a limited degree, and by greater elevation beyond that. Now, there is nothing so contrary to accuracy at any distances as great elevation. So long as the line of flight of the shot does not, at its highest point, much exceed the height of the object aimed at, so long a mistake in estimating the distance is of little importance; but at long range, the shot takes a very high flight, and comes down at angle on an average twice as great as that under which it began its flight (this, of course, is confined to elevations up to about 15 degrees). Thus, the higher the elevation the more the line in which the shot strikes the ground approaches the vertical; and an error in estimating the distance of not more than ten or twenty yards may preclude the possibility of hitting at all. At ranges even beyond 400 or 500 yards, such errors are unavoidable, and the consequence is the astonishing difference between the capital shooting on the practice ground, with measured distances, and the execrable practice on the battle-field, where the distances are unknown, the objects moving, and the moments for reflection very short. Thus, with the new rifles, the chance of hitting beyond three hundred yards on the battle-field is very small, while under three hundred yards, from the low flight of the ball, it is very great; in consequence of which, the charge with the

bayonet becomes the most effective means of dislodging an enemy, as soon as the attacking body has come up to that distance. Suppose one army to carry rifles which at 400 yards give no higher trajectory than the rifles of their opponents give at 300 yards, the former will have the advantage of beginning an effective fire at 100 yards greater distance, and as but three or four minutes are required to charge through 400 yards, this advantage is not a mean one in the decisive moment of a battle. It is similar with cannon. Sir Howard Douglas, ten years ago, declared that gun far the best which gives the greatest range with the least elevation. With rifled cannon the importance of this point is still greater, as the chance of error in estimating distance increases with the longer range, and as the ricochets of any other than spherical shot cannot be relied upon. This is one of the disadvantages of rifled guns; they must hit with the first impact if they are to hit at all, while round-shot, if it falls short, will rebound and continue its flight in very nearly its original direction. Here, then, a low trajectory is of the very highest importance, as every degree more of elevation reduces the chance of hitting with the first impact in an increasing ratio, and therefore the high line of flight produced by the French guns is one of their most serious defects.

But the whole of the deficiencies of these guns are crowned and enhanced by one defect, which suffices to stamp the whole system. They are produced by the machinery and on the principles formerly serving for the manufacture of the smooth-bored guns. With the very great windage of these old guns, and the varying weights and diameters of the shot, mathematical precision in the manufacture was but a secondary consideration. The manufacture of firearms, up to a very few years ago, was the most backward branch of modern industry. There was

far too much hand labor and far too little machinery. For the old smooth-bore arms this might be allowable; but when arms were to be manufactured which were expected to have great precision at long distances, this system became intolerable. To insure the certainty that every musket should shoot perfectly alike at 600, 800, 1,000 yards, and every cannon at 2,000, 4,000, 6,000 yards, it became necessary that every part of every operation should be performed by the most perfect and self-acting machinery, so as to turn out one weapon the mathematical counterpart of the other. Deviations from mathematical precision, inappreciable under the old system, now became defects rendering the whole weapon useless. The French have not improved their old machinery to any noticeable extent and hence the irregularities in their firing. How can guns be made to give the same range at the same elevation, all other circumstances being alike, when none of them is identical with the other in every particular? But irregularities in manufacture which at 800 yards produce differences of a yard, at 4,000 will produce differences of a hundred yards in range. How, then, can such guns be expected to be true at long ranges?

To recapitulate: the French rifled guns are bad, because they must have windage; because they require, comparatively, great elevations; and because their workmanship is not at all up to the requirements of rifled long-range guns. They must soon be superseded by different constructions, or they will reduce the French artillery practice to the worst in Europe.

We have purposely examined these guns a little in detail, as they gave us, thereby, an opportunity of explaining the chief principles of rifled ordnance. In a concluding article we shall consider the two systems proposed, which in England are now con-

testing for superiority — systems both of which are founded upon loading by the breech, absence of windage, and perfect workmanship—the Armstrong system and that of Whitworth.

III²

We now come to the description of the two kinds of breech-loading rifled cannon which at the present moment contend for superiority in England, and which, both invented by civilians, certainly surpass in efficiency anything hitherto produced by professional artillerists — the Armstrong gun and the Whitworth gun.

Sir William Armstrong's gun had the advantage of priority, and of being praised by the whole press and official world of England. It is, undoubtedly, a highly effectively machine of war, and far superior to the French rifled gun; but whether it can beat Whitworth's gun may well be doubted.

Sir Wm. Armstrong constructs his gun by wrapping, round a tube of cast steel, two layers of wrought-iron in a spiral form, the upper layer laid on in the opposite direction to the lower one, in the same way as gun-barrels are made from layers of wire. This system gives a very strong and tough material, though a very expensive one. The bore is rifled with numerous narrow grooves, one close to the other, and having one turn in the length of the gun. The oblong—cylindro-ogival—shot is of cast-iron, but covered with a mantle of lead, which gives it a diameter somewhat larger than the bore; this shot, along with the charge, is introduced by the breech into a chamber wide enough to receive it; the explosion propels the shot into the narrow bore, where the soft lead is pressed into the grooves, and thus does away with all windage while giving the projectile the spiral rotation indicated by the pitch of the grooves. This mode of pressing

the shot into the grooves, and the coating of soft material required for it, are the characteristic features of Armstrong's system; and if the reader will refer to the principles of rifled ordnance, as developed in our preceding articles, he will agree that, in principle, Armstrong is decidedly in the right. The shot being larger in diameter than the bore, the gun is necessarily breech-loading, which, to us, also seems a necessary feature in all rifled ordnance. The breech-loading apparatus itself, however, has nothing whatever to do with the principle of any particular system of rifling, but may be transferred from one to the other; we leave it, therefore, entirely out of our consideration.

The range and precision attained with this new gun are something wonderful. The shot was thrown to some 8,500 yards, or nearly five miles, and certainty with which the target was hit at 2,000 or 3,000 yards much exceeded what the old smooth-bore guns could show at one-third of these distances. Still, with all the puffing of the English press, the scientifically interesting details of all these experiments were studiously kept secret. It was never stated with what elevation and charge these ranges were obtained; the weight of the shot and that of the gun itself, the exact lateral and longitudinal deviations, etc., were never particularized. Now, at last, when the Whitworth gun has made its appearance, we learn some details of one set of experiments at least. Mr. Sidney Herbert, Secretary of War, has stated in Parliament that a 12-pounder gun of 8 cwt., with 1 lb. 8 oz. of powder, gave a range of 2,460 yards, at 7 degrees elevation, with an extreme lateral deviation of three, and an extreme longitudinal deviation of 65 yards. At eight degrees elevation, the range was 2,797 yards; at nine, above 3,000 yards; the deviations remaining nearly the same. Now, an elevation of seven to nine

² *New York Tribune*, May 5, 1860.

degrees is a thing unknown in the practice of smooth-bore field artillery. The official tables, for instance, do not go beyond four degrees elevation, at which the 12-pounder and 9-pounder give a range of 1,400 yards. Any higher elevation in field guns would be useless, from giving too high a line of flight, and thereby immensely reducing the chance of hitting the mark. But we have some experiments (quoted in Sir Howard Douglas' *Naval Gunnery*) with heavy ship guns of smooth bore at higher elevations. The English long 32-pounder at Deal, in 1839, gave ranges, at 7 degrees, of 2,231 to 2,318; at 9 degrees, from 2,498 to 2,682 yards. The French 36-pounder in 1846 and '47, gave ranges, at 7 degrees, of 2,270; at 9 degrees, of 2,636 yards. This shows that, at equal elevations, the ranges of rifled guns are not so very superior to those of smooth-bored cannon.

The Whitworth gun, in almost every respect, is the opposite of the Armstrong gun. Its bore is not circular, but hexagonal; the pitch of its rifling is very near twice as high as that of the Armstrong gun; the shot is of a very hard material, without any coating of lead; and, if it is breech-loading, it is not necessarily so, but merely as a matter of convenience and of fashion. This gun is of a recently-patented material, called "homogeneous iron," of great strength, elasticity, and toughness; the shot is a mathematically exact fit to the bore, and cannot, therefore, be introduced without the bore being lubricated. This is done by a composition of wax and grease being inserted between charge and shot, which at the same time tends to decrease whatever windage there may be left. The material of the gun is so tough that it will easily stand 3,000 rounds without any damage to the bore.

The Whitworth gun was brought before the public in February last, when a series

of experiments were made with it at Southport, on the Lancashire coast. There were three guns—a 3-pounder, 12-pounder, and 80-pounder; from the long reports we select the 12-pounder as an illustration. This gun was 7 feet 9 inches long, and weighed 8 cwt. The common 12-pounder, for round shot, is [] feet six inches long, and weighs 18 cwt. The ranges obtained with Whitworth's gun were as follows: At 2 degrees elevation (where the old 12-pounder gives 1,000 yards), with a charge of $1\frac{3}{4}$ lb., the range varied from 1,208 to 1,281 yards. At 5 degrees (where the old 32-pounder gives 1,940 yards,) it ranged from 2,298 to 2,342 yards. At 10 degrees (range of old 32-pounder, 2,800 yards), it averaged 4,000 yards. For higher elevations, a 3-pounder gun was used, with 8 oz. charge; with twenty degrees, it ranged from 6,300 to 6,800, with 33 and 35 degrees, 9,400 to 9,700 yards. The old 56-pounder, of smooth bore, gives, at 20 degrees, a range of 4,381 yards, at 32 degrees, of 5,680 yards. The precision obtained by the Whitworth gun was very satisfactory, and at least as good as that of the Armstrong gun in lateral deflection; as to longitudinal variations, the experiments do not admit of a satisfactory conclusion.

IV³

The Whitworth gun is constructed upon the principle of reducing windage to the utmost minimum, by a mathematical fit of the bore, and doing away with what little may remain by the effect of a lubricating composition. In this respect it is inferior to Armstrong's gun, which has no windage at all; and this we consider its principal defect. The polygonal bore, however, would be impossible without this defect, and at all events it deserves to be acknowledged that with such an originally defective system, such great results have been obtained. Whit-

³ *New York Tribune*, May 19, 1860.

worth has undoubtedly brought to its highest perfection the system which gives hard, unyielding shot and allows windage. His gun is immensely superior to the rough empiricism of the French rifled ordnance. But while Armstrong's gun, and other guns depending on soft-coated shot to be forced into the grooves by pressure, may be perfected *ad infinitum*, Whitworth's gun will have no such future; it has already attained the highest perfection compatible with its fundamental principles.

To recapitulate:

We find that at the *practicable elevation* of field-artillery, the best rifled guns known give a range but *very little* superior to the old smooth-bore gun. There is, however, some advantage, and this remains an item in their favor. But the great *advantages* of rifled ordnance for field-artillery are these:

1. The same weight of shot can be projected by a gun having a much smaller bore, and with a much smaller charge than with the old smooth-bore gun, which was only fit for spherical shot. Consequently, the weight of the gun is considerably reduced. The old 12-pounder had a bore of about $4\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and weighed 18 cwt.; its charge was four pounds of powder. The new 12-pounder has a bore of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches, or nearly that of the old 9-pounder; its weight, 8 cwt.; charge, from $1\frac{1}{2}$ to $1\frac{3}{4}$ pounds. The French new 12-pounders, with the old 4-pounder's bore, are still lighter. This is an immense advantage. It gives to the field-gun a mobility hitherto unknown, and renders it almost as fit to go over any ground as infantry. More than four horses to a gun will henceforth be useless.

2. At the distance hitherto practicable for field-artillery, it gives a far greater chance of hitting; it lowers the trajectory, and reduces to a minimum both lateral and longitudinal deflections. At an exchange of round

shot and shells with percussion fuses, a rifled battery will always beat a smooth-bored one of equal weight of shot.

As to heavy ordnance, it will be all-powerful against stone walls, especially by shell-practice with percussion fuses. This has already been proved by experiment, both in France and Germany. It will give ships and siege batteries a chance of bombarding towns at distances from 4,000 to 9,000 yards. In every other respect it will not alter materially existing relations of besiegers and besieged, and of ships against batteries on shore.

On the other hand, the *disadvantages* of rifled ordnance are:

1. The common case-shot becomes either impossible or ineffective from the irregular line of flight imparted to the balls by the spiral rotation.

2. Firing with shell with time-fuses (and shrapnel with ditto) becomes almost impracticable, as the absence or reduction of windage prevents the flame of the explosion from communicating with the fuse which necessarily must be at the point of the oblong shot.

In spite of these drawbacks, rifled ordnance has now become a matter of necessity for every army. The question now is only, how these drawbacks can be obviated. That they will be so there can be no doubt. But it is certain that the same rules obtain in rifled ordnance which regulate the construction and use of rifled small arms. The exaggerated idea of five-mile ranges in the one are as ridiculous as the notion of hitting a man with the new rifles at 800 or 1,000 yards; and still the advantages given by rifled bores, in either case, are so great that it is imperative upon every army which may ever be called upon to fight with civilized foes, to do away with all smooth-bored barrels, both in small arms and artillery.

THE MILITARY LIBRARY

Editor: GEORGE J. STANSFIELD

REVIEWS

Negro Militia and Reconstruction. By Otis A. Singletary. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957. Pp. 181. \$3.75.)

In manuscript form, this study won the Moncado Award of our Military Institute in 1954. A summary of its contents was read before the American Historical Association in 1952, and, somewhat altered, appeared in these pages during the winter of 1955.

But other reasons than these impel us to praise these hundred and a half pages of text, done by a very competent historian who has delved far and wide and synthesized well on a series of now apparently minor events, which have broad implications at all times in a nation with a political structure such as ours. The book is narrative, but its value—aside from its exciting readability—can best be explained in analysis rather than in anecdote.

During the 19th century at least, two major factors were behind the organization of militia units: (1) a desire to have armed citizens in recognized units ready "to preserve the peace," not to foment trouble; and (2) the utilization of social forces to create and maintain such units. These principles are old and basic, and to a great extent both underlie our more formal National Guard organization of today. Applying them at the grass roots, a state had available military force for its own purposes and was in a position to contribute that same force to the nation in a broader emergency. The militia idea was supposed to be a popular idea and to make unnecessary that militarism supposed to rest upon standing armies. This was thought to be quite proper in a democracy. But it had its dangers in days

when government and people might have divergent views.

These dangers this book shows in the decade following the Civil War.

Take several States of the Union under Reconstruction governments and forbidden to have militia forces. Then remove that prohibition so that the governments dominated by Radical Republicans might have such forces for "purely political" motives, and who will join those forces? How can they be raised? They were not exclusively Negro units, although largely so. They were used for "military parades in support of Republican candidates" and to maintain the results of elections. In some areas, the Republicans were in the majority; in most they were in control of public offices although not in the majority. Their "militia" was, to say the least, touched with the tar brush, and so they conferred on the former slave class a status and a dignity that were intolerable to many and many a Conservative-minded Southerner. Further, the Negro militia was often incompetent, badly disciplined, and ill-behaved. Yet this was a legal force, and no armed units were supposed to exist unless authorized by the existing State governments. It can definitely be said, in general, that the Negro militia was not the popular force that a militia is supposed to be.

So there grew up counter forces, created actually "to put the control of the government into the hands of the white people of the State," and to do this "by force if necessary," and effect the restoration of white supremacy—even against remnants of the carpetbagger control. This was the notorious White League movement of the 1870's. This was the cause of actual fighting and violence

in Arkansas, New Orleans, Mississippi, and South Carolina, sometimes with Negro militia on both sides, but usually with the whites against the blacks in the clashes.

The white units were likely to be pretending to be "chiefly social" to promote "the virtues of friendship and manly exercise" but they got arms in one way or another even if not calling themselves a "Sabre Club," but only a Church Sewing Circle, a Musical Club, or Mounted Baseball Club. Sometimes they stole shipments of arms destined for the official Negro militia units; sometimes they just took them away from those units. The situation in politics on several occasions was resolved by "not the number of votes but the number of guns."

Through this maze of facts which made headlines and compounded worries in the 1870's, Professor Singletary steps with an eye on the actual. He has unearthed data and organized his data well. As a historian, he has not indulged in any might-have-been ruminations, nor tried to theorize as a political scientist. Yet, in these days of 1957, when the militia of Arkansas has just been used by its governor for one purpose, and then federalized and used by the general government for another, the events which our historian so well recounts are important to remember. The National Guard is not merely a disaster force, nor a force for the State, but also a useful manpower reinforcement for the standing army of the nation as a whole. It must be also a reflection of the political and social thought of the people, and it might become a tool for unscrupulous men—in or out of government. In the last analysis, the people must rule. It was for this reason that the Bill of Rights tried to protect the right of the people to bear arms, and the Constitution itself reflected the 18th-century doctrine that a popular militia must be maintained.

There are implications which might come to mind out of a reading of this book that are too numerous and too serious to examine within the scope of a brief review. But they should concern the mind of any man interested in the relations between democracy and military power. For such studious concern, the situations and the events in this book are a necessary and useful element.

ELBRIDGE COLBY
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The Arab-Israeli War, 1948. By Edgar O'Ballance. (New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. 211. \$4.75.)

For several reasons, the information available on the military aspects of the Arab-Israeli War has been meager. There has been a general reluctance on the part of the opposing parties fully to discuss the conduct of operations, much of the information obtainable has been conflicting in nature, and, finally, the political implications of the conflict so have outweighed the military struggle as to tend to obscure it.

Through careful research, Major O'Ballance has been able to tell the story of these military operations in a balanced and objective fashion. While he has established the political background necessary to an understanding of the cause of the war, he has not attempted a political analysis of the dispute. Rather, his efforts have been directed primarily toward a professional soldier's appreciation of combat operations. Where his accounts differ in minor degree from those of other competent observers, it must be realized that these differences have been due to a conflict in the evidence available.

The author has addressed himself to many of the questions concerning this war which still remain in dispute. Why, for example, did the reputedly superior Arab armies fail to gain an early victory? Was this failure attributable to organizational problems or to lack of *esprit*? Was the strength of the Israeli Army underestimated at the outset of the war? To what extent did political factors affect the military outcome? In addition to detailed descriptions of the many separate engagements that took place, Major O'Ballance has brought out the salient features which appear to have characterized the conduct of operations by the opposing factions. He has discussed the logistical problems facing both armies, pointed out the capabilities of the Israeli for improvisation, and illustrated sufficient instances of tenacity on the part of both Arab and Israeli to indicate that courage and a will to fight was not the sole property of either. However, the contrast drawn between the Israeli capacity for organization and a corresponding Arab weakness leaves no doubt as to the ever-present military requirements for effective command relationships, sound decisions, thorough planning, and determined execution.

All in all, the author has produced an excellent and comprehensive treatise on the Arab-Israeli

War; it will prove of value and interest to the student of military science.

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July, 1863. By Irving Werstein. (New York: Julian Messner, Inc., 1957. Pp. 252. Illus. \$3.95.)

This is a short account of the draft riots in New York City in mid-July 1863, just after Gettysburg, which were not completely quelled until the War Department relieved 11 New York regiments on 15 July for duty in the city, including the 7th, "The Old Guard," and the 69th, "The Fighting Irish."

Meanwhile, the defense of the city was in the hands of the 2,000-man Metropolitan Police, whose 32 precincts were linked with police headquarters by telegraph (except when the rioters cut the wires) and various troop units, including Invalid Corps veterans. The police, with their nightsticks, performed admirably, but were unable to prevail without military aid.

Although at the outset the rioting was in opposition to selection and enrolment under the National Conscription Act of 3 March 1863, it very soon embraced a mammoth hunting down and burning out of Negroes, and its original purpose was largely lost in its racial fury. This attack on the Negroes was a result of the bitter poverty of all the city's second-class citizens, white and black, and their "desperate competition," as Werstein says, particularly competition between Negroes and Irish immigrants, for marginal jobs. Put simply, the draft exempted the Negroes, which their miserable white competitors "resented bitterly." To the latter it was a "rich man's war and a poor man's fight" from which their competitors were excluded. Why, they thought, should they get killed for their black rivals? (That Negroes, aided by the Bureau of Colored Troops, announced by the War Department in May 1863, would eventually enlist in such numbers as to make up approximately one-eighth of the entire Union Army, as Benjamin Quarles points out, could obviously mean nothing to the New York rioters at the time of the first draft in July 1863.) Copperheads and professional draft-evaders helped prepare the stage for the riots, and Confederate agents no doubt lent encouragement if not outright aid, although the part they played is not clear.

The author not only reconstructs the events of

the four days of senseless destruction of persons and property, but he describes them and the leading participants with photographic clarity—barricades, besotted rioters, charging police, squalid slums, burning dwellings, terrorized victims, able Police Commissioner Acton, dutiful Mayor Opdycke, unhappy Governor Seymour (on the job though at odds with the Lincoln Administration and gravely disappointed at the ineffectiveness of his 14 July call for an end to rioting), the arrival of seasoned troops from Gettysburg, and so on. Strange and fearsome, though etymologically understandable, was the hysteria of women members of the mob, who, Werstein repeats, were more vehement than the men, urging them on to terrible deeds—as observers found women doing in Little Rock 94 years later.

July, 1863 is well written, as one would expect the product of a professional writer to be. Yet the historian must regret that the author creates some of the rioters, even if not out of whole cloth; that he puts words in the mouths of historical characters (even though he evokes a smile when he has indignant old General Harvey Brown explode in anger about a military colleague: "For all I care the rebels can burn this goddamn city. Let Sandford run the show. I'm through!"); and that his research is not broader and deeper. Though not straight history and not the last word on the subject, this is a good book.

PAUL J. SCHEIPS
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Gunner with Stonewall. *Reminiscences of William Thomas Poague, Lieutenant, Captain, Major and Lieutenant Colonel of Artillery, Army of Northern Virginia, CSA, 1861-65. A memoir written for his children in 1903.* (Ed. Monroe F. Cockrell, with intro. Bell Irvin Wiley; Jackson, Tennessee: McCowat-Mercer Press, Inc., 1957. Pp. xxii and 181. Illus. Index. \$5.95.)

In December 1862, Lee anticipated a wide turning movement by Burnside against his vulnerable right flank. To meet it, he extended Jackson's corps about twenty miles from Fredericksburg to Port Royal. Only at the last moment when Burnside's plan became certain did he concentrate his two corps on the hills west of Fredericksburg. What this and similar moves meant to a battery commander in Jackson's corps enlivens the strategy and tactics of that battle and of all the other campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia.

Captain Poague's battery was in camp near Port Royal, where his two 20-pounder Parrotts "were expected to look after the gunboats" on the Rapahannock. Towards sunset on December 12th the battery was ordered to move at once to Fredericksburg. The enthusiasm of his men, the all-night march by an interior road, the detachment of two of his guns to Major Pelham at Hamilton's Crossing, his personal encounter with Stonewall Jackson, and that general's astounding order for his battery are some of the episodes that make his account of Fredericksburg on December 13th a matter of flesh and blood. Although Captain (later Lieut. Col. Poague) omits many points a modern artilleryman would like to know about his profession in the Civil War, his memoirs tell far more about the gunners in Lee's army than can ordinarily be found elsewhere. Poague has much to say also about many Confederate leaders and about the enlisted men of the Army. His memoirs make good reading and prove that the artilleryman has been too long neglected in view of the importance of his tactical contribution on the Civil War battlefields.

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The First and the Last: The Rise and Fall of the German Fighter Forces, 1938-1945. By Adolf Galland. (Trans. M. Savill; New York: H. Holt, 1954. Pp. 368. \$4.75; New York: Ballentine Books, 1957. Pp. 284. 50c.)

The First and the Last is Galland's personalized account of World War II as viewed by a young and war-elevated German air commander. Joining the secret *Luftwaffe*, he first saw combat in the limited war in Spain as a member of the Kondor Legion. A *Stuka* pilot over Poland, he rose rapidly in rank as a fighter pilot in France. By 1942, at 30 years of age, Galland had 94 kills to his credit, was a major general in rank, and *Luftwaffe* Inspector General of Fighters.

His volume begins with the Battle of Britain where he became commander of a fighter wing. His view of World War II is essentially that of the new generation of German airmen, which he explains as follows:

The old fighter pilots from World War I, who were now (1940) sitting "at the joy stick" of the supreme command of the *Luftwaffe*, with Goering at their head, had a compulsory pause of 15 years behind them, during which they had probably lost contact with the rapid development of aviation. . . .

From the "indescribable misery" of defeated Germany Galland develops his airman's thesis of World War II:

The *Luftwaffe* had revealed her limitations and weakness to the whole world during the Battle of Britain. The myth of her invincibility had been exploded. But something else had occurred which nobody could have anticipated: The first step [in air war] Germany had undertaken with the opening of the Battle of Britain led into uncharted fields of air strategy, and became a hypothesis for the second, the finally successful, step. This was taken by the Allies, following German footsteps. The first step was full of risks and dangers. Germany stumbled but did not fall. Only the second step brought the success to the others—the destruction to Germany.

It was Galland who bluntly told Goering during the Battle of Britain: "I should like a squadron of Spitfires for my squadron." It was Galland in April 1944 who went on record as saying: "At this moment I would rather have one Me-262 than five Me-109's." He fought passionately for jet interceptor aircraft against red tape. Hitler in rage issued his amazing order that jet interceptor aircraft were categorically "fighter-bombers." The German Supreme Commander viewed the Me-262 as a *Blitzbomber* to chop up the Allied invasion of the continent which was yet to come in Normandy. When Galland, then Inspector General of Fighters, again re-appealed to Hitler in person for a reconsideration of the *Blitzbomber* question, he was demoted and removed from command and flying status. Galland could not, he says, "call a horse a cow." Eventually, when it was too late, even Hitler changed his mind. Subsequently Galland was recalled to command of an *Oberst*-manned Me-262 squadron based near Munich. With small numbers Galland's group flew with considerable effect against American bomber formations until the last days of the war in Europe.

The reader will find General Galland's book enjoyable, for it reflects the experiences of an active pilot and a brilliant young man. However, his stimulating hindsight views, tempered by the time and tide of the past ten years, must be evaluated against the archives by the historian of Nazi Germany's defeat in the air.

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Glossary of Archival and Records Administration Terms Applicable to the Work of the Departmental Records Branch. By Kenneth Munden. (Departmental Records Branch Publication No. 57-3 [Washington 1957]: Department of the Army. Pp. 495.

Surely no kind of book is harder to review than a dictionary. These are the bare physical facts about this one: It is mimeographed. It is $7\frac{3}{4} \times 10\frac{1}{4}$ in format. It weighs $2\frac{1}{4}$ pounds. It is stapled in light card-stock covers. It contains about 4,000 entries. Of its 490 pages, pp. 439-64 are bound in reverse and p. 370 is missing in this reviewer's copy.

The evaluation of a dictionary may be based on its *inclusions* (considered in the light of its purposes) and correlatively on its *exclusions*; on its *clarity*; on its *relationship* to other similar works; and on its *personality*.

"Personality" may seem to be an odd trait to look for in a glossary; but, historically, dictionaries have varied in flavor and derive some part of their continuing interest to their character or point of view. Thus, the Diderot-and-Company *Encyclopédie* was an outline of eighteenth-century rationalism; and Dr. Johnson's dictionary has been credited with so salty an observation as "GRATITUDE: A lively expectation of favors to come."

Dr. Munden's glossary is not without salt. Take "EXTRA COPY: A standard cliché, especially in the plural, in describing records in proposing their disposition; but extra to what? must be made clear." Or "FUGITIVE RECORDS: Although it appeals to the imagination to suggest that records, once archival in character but now alienated, are fugitive, the term ALIENATED RECORDS . . . is preferred by many archivists. To librarians the nearly identical term 'fugitive material' connotes material printed in limited quantities, usually of immediate interest only at the time of . . . publication. Archivists who speak of 'fugitive records' intend, of course, no such meaning." Or, finally, "LETTER: . . . If I scrawl a message to you on a piece of paper and slip it into your hand, is that a letter or no? If I take the same piece of paper . . . and send it to you by messenger or mail it, does that make it a letter?"

Let us consider the "clusiveness" of Dr. Munden's work, both in- and ex- (cf. the glossary's "encryption" and "decryption," p. 121). It aims to include all archival and records administration terms—a limited objective; but also all military

terms that have an archival or record connotation, and as well administrative terms that have such a connotation in non-military agencies with which the military deal. Altogether this is a very large order. Add to this the objective of giving the glossary "training values," and the critical hypothesis emerges that the work may be too inclusive.

For example, are the following terms different enough in their archival and their ordinary meanings to warrant inclusion?

ACCESS

ARCHIVAL LITERATURE

ARCHIVAL POINT OF VIEW (and
AGENCY POINT OF VIEW)

CONDOLENCE LETTER FILE ("re-
tained copies of . . . letters . . . to
next-of-kin"—but "next-of-kin" is not
defined)

DRIVER'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT
FILE

EXPLOITATION OF RECORDS

EXPLORATION OF RECORDS

NEED TO KNOW

As a glossarist (*v. Webster's International*, p. 1066, and cf. "glossarian," *ibid.*) who included "container" and "shelving"—although successfully fighting off "shelf"—this reviewer should perhaps not raise the point of overinclusiveness. And it should be pointed out that of the ten terms listed above, six are referenced to Army and other pertinent regulations, and one ("ARCHIVAL LITERATURE") cites at length a useful standard bibliographical outline.

There are grounds for saying, then, that this is not so much a glossary as it is an alphabetically-arranged manual of Army and Air Force procedures as they relate to records and archives, with very considerable coverage of related non-military terms. It is normative, as the older general dictionaries were, in telling us what words should or must mean, according to what the best people or formal etymology or in this case "higher echelons" dictate, as well as being scientific, like the post-Webster dictionaries, in telling us what words actually do mean in accepted usage. This accounts in large part for its size and its "clusiveness" (in- and ex-).

Its clarity and its personality it owes to its author. It is a very interesting and useful job.

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The Zeppelin in the Atomic Age. By Edwin J. Kirschner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1957. Pp. viii and 80. \$3.50.)

Slim jets roaring across the blue of the skies will never replace in my mind the memory of the slow, majestic, giant zeppelins. If Mr. Kirschner's arguments are effective, the present generation may have an opportunity to see such sights again—which has never been thought possible since the "Hindenburg's" flame-wrapped frame crashed to the ground at Lakehurst in 1937.

In a slim book whose format has been strikingly designed to catch the eye, the author considers the historical, engineering, economic, and political—domestic and international—aspects of the zeppelins. The terse text has been pared down into almost outline form.

There are a few errors in the historical survey—Zeppelin was not a volunteer in the Union Army, the influence of Lowe's balloons on him is sheer folklore, Parseval did not make semi-rigid dirigibles but rather non-rigid ones, and so on. However, history is simply a millstone around the neck of future zeppelin development: Disaster stalks its pages except in a few instances, notably the "Los Angeles" and the "Graf Zeppelin."

The author's greatest contribution is an outline of the modern history of proposed American legislation and hearings and the attention that he calls to the Air Coordinating Committee. The need for a clear-cut revision of federal policy relating to the field of transportation is clearly shown. As in the case of all arguments, there is room for debate with many of Mr. Kirschner's statements, but they are provocative reading.

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SHORT REVIEWS

AMERICAN ASSEMBLY: *International Stability and Progress; United States Interests and Investments.* (1st. ed.; New York: The American Assembly, Grad. Sch. of Bus., Columbia University, 1957. Pp. 184. Apply.)

The background papers and report of the Eleventh Assembly, May 2-5, 1957. "Ends and Means of American Foreign Policy," by Philip C. Jessup, pp. 11-38, and the "Policy Background for Military Assistance," by Paul H. Nitze, pp. 99-119, are most valuable for the student of military affairs.

ASSOCIATION OF THE U. S. ARMY: *The Security of the Nation*; a study of current problems of

national defense. (Washington: The Association, 1957. Pp. 29. Apply.)

Views on major issues and the Army's mission and role in maintaining the security of the U. S. Included are pertinent agreements on service roles and missions. Valuable.

ARMY LIBRARY, AGO, Dept. of the Army: *Mobility in Modern Warfare.* Special Bibliography, No. 13, 9 July 1957. (Ltd. ed.; Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 175.)

———. *Military Power and National Objectives.* Special Bibliography No. 15, 19 August 1957. (Ltd. ed.; Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 181.)

Two examples of recent bibliographies covering both European and American sources. They are of great value not only for today's soldier but for the historian by providing a large number of annotated book and periodical citations.

U. S. 84TH CONGRESS, 2d Sess., House Committee on Foreign Affairs: *Treaty Provisions Relating to the Use of U. S. Forces for Mutual Defense.* (Washington: GPO, 1956. Pp. 68. Maps. Committee print. Apply.)

Prepared by Miss Helen Matlas of the Committee staff, it provides a ready reference for understanding its subject in relation to current military problems.

U. S. 85TH CONGRESS, 1st Sess., Senate Committee on Armed Services: *Airpower*: report of the sub-committee on the air force. (Senate Document No. 29; Washington: GPO, 1957. Pp. 128.)

This report, based upon the 2 volumes of hearings of the previous session, was made by Senator Symington and includes minority views of Senator Saltonstall and former Senator Duff.

ASHEY, MAURICE: *Marlborough.* (New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 144. Bibl. \$1.50.)

BUTTERFIELD, HERBERT: *Napoleon.* (New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 143. Bibl. \$1.50.)

WEDGEWOOD, C. V.: *Oliver Cromwell.* (New York: Macmillan, 1956. Pp. 144. Bibl. \$1.50.)

Compact, readable revised biographies in the "Great Lives Series," first published in 1939 in England. They are by authorities on the figures treated, to whose lives they provide introductions. Recommended.

KANNIK, PREBEN: *The Flag Book*; flags and insignias of all nations. (New York: M. Barrows and Co., 1957. Pp. 196. Illus. in color by W. Peterson, \$3.50.)

In this excellent volume, printed in Denmark, there are 860 colored illustrations of current and

historic flags and coats of arms arranged geographically. In addition, there is a brief history of flags, a description of the proper method of displaying the American flag, a glossary, a paragraph description of each flag, military and civilian, and an index. For anyone interested in flags this will be a handy reference tool. Recommended.

CANADA HISTORICAL SECTION, GENERAL STAFF, ARMY: *The Western Front, 1914*. (Ottawa: Edmond Cloutier, Queens Printer, 1957. Pp. 192. \$1.00. Supt. Gov. Pub., Ottawa; in Canadian funds with postage extra outside USA and Canada.)

Another in the series of thorough scholarly military studies prepared in Canada. Documented with clear maps, its 2-page bibliography indicates the use of recent (1956) and standard sources. As Chapter VIII, "Summary and Commentary," points out, it presents a description of modern mobile warfare on the grandest scale. Inexpensive as it is, it merits purchase by every military historian.

PEATTIE, DONALD C.: *Parade with Banners*. (Cleveland and New York: World Publishing Co., 1957. Pp. 251. \$3.50.)

A collection of the author's stories of the American spirit, most of which appeared in the *Reader's Digest*, prepared at the request of the author's son while serving with the U.S.I.A. in Cambodia. It provides sources of inspiration and admirably fulfills the need.

COLBY, C. B.: *Leatherneck* (on the training, weapons, and equipment of the U. S. Marine Corps); *Firing Line* (on the weapons, vehicles, rockets, and research of the Army Proving Grounds, Aberdeen, Md.); and *Firearms by Winchester*. (New York: Coward McCann, 1957. Pp. 48. \$2.00 each.)

Attractive, short, illustrated volumes designed for juvenile readers, they will make good presents for prospective military historians.

SMITH, DALE O., ELLER, E. M., and ROBINETT, P. M.: *Military Literature*; a reading guide to authoritative texts on the Army, Navy and Air Forces of the United States (Washington: American Ordnance Assoc., 1957. Pp. 15. Ap-
ply.)

Reprints of bibliographic articles by Generals Smith (USAF) and Robinett (USA) and Rear Admiral Eller (USN), which appeared in *Ordnance*. Military libraries can use them as checklists. Recommended.

ROCHE, JOHN F.: *Joseph Reed*; a moderate in the American Revolution. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Notes, bibl., index. \$5.00.)

A scholarly biography of the Continental Army's first adjutant general, 1776-1777, who proposed to write a military history of the War for Independence.

PETERSON, HAROLD L.: *Arms and Armor in Colonial America, 1526-1783*. (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Co., 1956. Pp. 350. \$12.50.)

Sponsored by the "Company of Military Collectors and Historians," this authoritative and outstanding volume is divided into two parts: "The Age of Colonization and Exploration, 1526-1688"; and "The French Wars and the Revolution, 1689-1783." Firearms, ammunition, equipment, edged weapons, and armor are described in the text and in 300 illustrations. Detailed footnotes appear at the end of each chapter. Pages 317-35 describe "the complete soldier" for each decade. The bibliography, divided into contemporary and secondary sources, lists only those volumes referred to in the text, pp. 337-45. A brief index covers the main text only. This is a monumental example of American military historical scholarship which readably describes the artifacts of war and the men who used them. It is an essential reference volume for every military historian.

AGAR, HERBERT: *The Price of Power, America Since 1945*. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957. Pp. 200. \$3.50.)

A volume in the new series of interpretations of American history, "The Chicago History of American Civilization." The author's point of view is an internationalist one, and his contemporary history is based upon personal acquaintance with many of the leading actors. The bibliographical notes and list of important dates are of interest.

It should be read as a journalistic interpretation of the politico-military events of the last decade rather than as a balanced and scholarly history.

HARTMAN, FREDERICK H.: *The Relations of Nations*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 637. \$6.25.)

A new text in international relations by a professor of political science at the University of Florida. The author's theory of international relations is that "there is a single theme common to the actions of nation-states in the sense that

they follow out in their policies their particular concept of their national interests."

For the military historian Chapter 8, "War," and Chapters 20 and 21, "Case Studies in Collective Security, Ethiopia and Korea," are of most interest. The last section covers the foreign policies of major powers and "Prospects and Perspectives." The bibliography is good, but additional titles and later editions of listed volumes indicate for the scholar that more work ought to have been done. On the whole it is an adequate volume and one that can stand comparison with other texts.

HAGEDORN, HERMANN (ed.): *The Theodore Roosevelt Treasury*. Introduction by Hagedorn. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1957. Pp. 342. \$6.00.)

A self-portrait from Roosevelt's many writings emerges from this authoritative compilation. While there is no bibliography, each quotation is carefully footnoted as to its printed sources, whose complete citations are found on the copyright page in the acknowledgements to publishers. The military historian will find "The Soldier," pp. 129-44, of much interest.

This is a centenary tribute to a great American that is both both an introduction to his life and a very useful reference source. Recommended.

COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, INC.: *Proceedings of the Presentation of the Williamsburg Award by the Trustees of Colonial Williamsburg to the Rt. Hon. Sir Winston Churchill at Draper's Hall, London, December 7, 1955*. (Williamsburg, Va.: Colonial Williamsburg, 1957. Pp. 48. Illus. Apply.)

Beautifully printed proceedings.

KIMMEL, STANLEY: *Mr. Lincoln's Washington*. (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957. Pp. 224. \$7.50.)

Civil War Washington and a picture history of President Lincoln are seen through 260 carefully chosen illustrations and 65,000 words of text based upon contemporary newspaper accounts. About 60 pages are concerned with the assassination of the President and its aftermath including a "sketch of the trial of the conspirators." While the text is undocumented and there is no bibliography other than references to newspapers, it remains a satisfactory compilation, for from it the reader gains a vivid impression of the war-torn city.

HUNT, R. N. Carew: *A Guide to Communist Jargon*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 169. \$3.50.)

The author of *The Theory and Practice of Communism* has presented a most valuable glossary of fifty basic terms used by Communists to express much of their ideology. It is valuable to the student of Communism and of contemporary problems. Recommended.

KIRKPATRICK, EVRON M. (ed.): *Year of Crisis, Communist Propaganda Activities in 1956*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 414. \$5.50.)

This is the second thorough and invaluable compilation by the present Executive Director of the American Political Science Association and is an essential tool for understanding the problems of today's troubled world. Recommended.

REISCHAUER, EDWIN O.: *The United States and Japan*. (Rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957. Pp. 394. \$5.50.)

This is a revision of the 1950 edition and provides a longer look at "The Post-War Japanese" than was possible in the earlier study. The volume covers "The Problem," "The Physical Setting," "The Japanese Character," and "The Occupation." Key documents and a valuable list of suggested readings complete the volume.

Dr. Reischauer is Professor of Far Eastern Languages at Harvard University and Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute. This revision of a volume in the "American Foreign Policy Library" is most welcome and will continue to provide one of the best introductions to Japan available to the American reader.

THOMPSON, R. W.: *The Eighty Five Days*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957. Pp. 220. Illus. 50c.)

A first-edition account of the failure of General Montgomery to open the port of Antwerp in the face of the fanatical resistance of German troops in massive concrete fortresses. Good maps and photographs enliven this narrative.

A WOMAN IN BERLIN. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957. Pp. 207; New York: Harcourt Brace, 1954. 35c.)

An anonymous German woman's account of the fall of Berlin to the Russians, April to June 1945.

CASTLE, JOHN: *The Password is Courage*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957; New York: Norton, 1955. Pp. 190. 35c.)

A valuable account of British Sergeant Major Charlie Coward who fought a one-man war as a POW amateur espionage agent.

WOODWARD, C. VANN: *The Battle for Leyte Gulf*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957. Pp. 190; New York: Macmillan, 1947. 35c.)

A reprint of the first full historical account of the battle.

BRYAN, III, J.: *Aircraft Carrier*. (New York: Ballantine Books, 1957 and 1954. Pp. 159. 35c.)

War in the Pacific on the "Yorktown." All of these volumes are part of the new series which bring the dramatic and important events of World War II to the buyer of low-priced books.

FICTION

CHARLES, TOM T.: *Never So Few*. (New York: Scribner, 1957. Pp. 449. \$4.50.)

This superior novel is based upon the author's World War II experiences in Burma where he commanded the 3rd Battalion, American Kachin Rangers. As a literary achievement it will stand as one of the best novels of the year.

O'DANIEL, JANET: *O Genesee*. (Philadelphia and

New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1958. Pp. 350. \$3.95.)

A very readable story based upon the settling of the Genesee Valley in Western New York, 1799-1813. The last section covers the reactions of the Valley to the War of 1812.

TREVOR, ELLESTON: *The Killing Ground*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 266. \$3.75.)

Another carefully written fictional account of the adventures of a single English tank squadron during the two months after D-day by the author of *The Big Pickup*.

REUSCH, HANS: *South of the Heart*; a novel of modern Arabia. (New York: Coward-McCann, 1957. Pp. 316. \$3.95.)

The author, a Swiss, who has lived in Arabia, tells his story as would a traditional teller of tales, providing insight into the mind and spirit of the Moslem world. His hero, Auda, nurtured in traditional Moslem virtues, leads his band of ragamuffins to victory through the desert of Arabia, "The Heart," against the armored cars and planes of his father's enemy. While he does not win total victory, his leadership under difficult war-time conditions gives him stature as a free man.

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PARK, ALEXANDER G.: *Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957. Pp. 442. \$6.75.)

WOLIN, SIMON, AND SLUSSER, ROBERT (eds.): *The Soviet Secret Police*. (New York: Praeger, 1957. Pp. 417. 13 pp. bibl. and 30 pp. bibl. notes. \$8.00.) (Research program on the U.S.S.R., Ser. No. 17.)

II. U. S. Foreign Relations

BEAL, JOHN R.: *John Foster Dulles: a biography*. Foreword by Thomas E. Dewey. (New York: Harper, 1957. Pp. 331. \$4.50.)

BEALE, HOWARD K.: *Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956. Pp. 600. \$6.00.)

BEMIS, SAMUEL F.: *The Diplomacy of the Amer-*

ican Revolution. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1957. Pp. 293. \$1.75.)

BERGER, CARL: *The Korea Knot*; a military-political history. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1957. Pp. 206. \$5.00.)

BUCK, PHILIP W., AND TRAVIS, MARTIN W., JR., (eds.): *Control of Foreign Relations in Modern Nations*. (New York: Norton, 1957. Pp. 879. \$6.75.)

CHARLESWORTH, JAMES C. (ed.): *The Future of the Western Alliance*. (Philadelphia: American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1957. Pp. 191. \$3.00; paper \$2.00.)

HAINES, CHARLES G.: *What Future For Europe?* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1957. Pp. 62. 35c.)

*HARTMANN, FREDERICK H.: *The Relations of Nations*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 664. \$6.25.)

HOROWITZ, IRVING L.: *The Idea of War and Peace in Contemporary Philosophy*. (New York: Paine-Whitman, 1957. Pp. 224. \$4.50.)

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- LOHBECK, DON: *Patrick J. Hurley*. (Chicago: Regnery, 1956. Pp. 513. \$6.50.)
- *MASTON, THOMAS B.: *Christianity and World Issues*. (New York: Macmillan, 1957. Pp. 374. \$5.00.)
- PETERSON, HORACE C., AND FITE, GILBERT C.: *Opponents of War, 1917-1918*. (Madison, Wisc.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1957. Pp. 412. \$6.00.)
- STRACHEY, ALIX: *The Unconscious Motives of War*; a psychoanalytical contribution. (New York: International University Press, 1957. Pp. 283. \$5.00.)
- STRATMANN, FRANZISKUS M.: *War and Christianity Today*. (Trans. John Doebele; Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1956. Pp. 134; London: Blackfriars Press, 12s6.)
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- BROOM, LEONARD: *The Managed Casualty*; the Japanese-American family in World War II. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956. Pp. 226. \$4.50; \$3.50.)
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- BURT, KENDAL AND LEASOR, JAMES: *The One That Got Away*. (New York: Random, 1956. Pp. 300. \$3.95.)
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*Prepared by R. W. Davis and M. O'Quinlivan.

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HEADQUARTERS GAZETTE

ANNUAL MEMBERSHIP MEETING

The annual membership meeting of the AMI was held at the National Archives in Washington on Thursday evening 5 December 1957, with the president, Col. T. N. Dupuy, presiding. This was the day after Washington's big snowstorm and the inclement weather kept many of our members away. It did not, however, keep our good friend C. E. Dornbusch away, for he came down from New York City to help provide a quorum. Not long ago he returned from a trip "Down Under" on behalf of military history and the New York Public Library.

A proposal to revise the Institute's certificate of incorporation, which had been approved by the Board of Trustees, was approved by the membership after discussion. This action provided that, in addition to the 18 elected trustees, the president, vice-president, editor, secretary, and treasurer would also serve on the board during their terms of office.

Brig. Gen. Donald Armstrong, USA (Ret.), and Capt. Samuel G. Kelly, USN (Ret.), were re-elected to the Board of Trustees, and Dr. George B. Dyer, a member of the Board several years ago, was returned to that office. Other trustees elected were Dr. Edward L. Katzenbach, Jr., of the Defense Studies Program, Harvard University; Dr. William Emerson, Yale University; and Dr. James Atkinson, Georgetown University. Brig. Gen. Paul M. Robinett, USA (Ret.), and Lt. Col. Francis O. Hough, USMC, retired from the Board and will be missed.

Committee reports revealed that plans are

being made for AMI meetings during the coming year, with an evening meeting to be held in Washington in February 1958; and that various plans are under consideration for a long-needed housing of the Institute and its library. Although the Membership Committee did not render a report, it can be said as we go to press that the membership campaign is producing encouraging results, with several new life memberships and a number of new annual memberships already reported. A more detailed accounting of new memberships will be given at a later date.

Col. Dupuy closed the meeting with the hope that the Institute can be strengthened and that it will be able to increase its influence in the months ahead.

IN THE MAIL

In re Weller: From Maj. T. M. Hunter, Historical Section (GS), Army Headquarters, Ottawa, Canada, has come the following professional comment:

While reading Mr. Jac Weller's interesting and informative article on "Partizan Weapons Tactics in the American Revolution" in the last issue of your journal, I was somewhat taken aback by an *obiter dictum*. Under the heading of "Surprise," the writer states that "there was a distinct tendency in the 17th and 18th Centuries in Europe towards formal fighting in which the unexpected was of relatively small importance."

While this statement may be applied correctly to much of the fighting of those centuries it is certainly not true of the period's greatest soldier. Indeed, Marlborough's use of surprise is one of his most enduring claims to fame. He used the principle not only strategically, as in his great march to the Danube (1704), but also tactically, in the battles of Blenheim (1704), Ramillies (1706)

and Oudenarde (1708). Even in his last major action, he employed surprise to pierce the celebrated "Ne Plus Ultra" Lines (1711) without firing a shot.

Luvaas' Scheibert: The Army's Col. William W. Robinson, Jr. (Ret.) writes from Quincy, Florida as follows: "... I congratulate you on the Fall [1957] number. . . . I am finding Prof. Luvaas' article on Scheibert's observations on Lee and the Confederate Army particularly interesting. He has made a significant contribution to military history."

Reply to Cox: A. G. Rosengarten, Jr., of Philadelphia writes that he is sufficiently

provoked to reply to Cox's "A Dynamic Philosophy of Airpower," which we published in the autumn 1957 number of *MA*. In his view "weapons and tactics are more important than philosophy and strategic doctrine," and "intellectuals," he thinks, "will do better to worry about them than about high strategy." He agrees with Cyril Falls, as he (Rosengarten) puts it, "that strategy wrongly attracts most notice." In his opinion it would be "fatal to get into [a] race with Russia for longest range when accuracy is the essential," until such time as missiles become so powerful that accuracy and range "are no longer important."

FACT AND OPINION: A POTPOURRI*

By Paul J. Scheips

For Humanity's Sake: Some of us—and we hope a growing number—see the headlong race to be first with an "operational" intercontinental ballistic missile, and then with a space platform, and then with only God knows what, as leading only to ultimate disaster. Perhaps, indeed, the "ultimate weapon" we seek is the one that will destroy Earth with one blast, leaving only a puff of cosmic dust where once there was a planet bearing the hopes and fears of billions of mankind. One voice not stilled by fear or by a callousness for humanity or by prohibitions against breaching official positions, is that of Gen. Omar N. Bradley, who spoke up in a public address in Washington last November. He described the creation of greater weapons of destruction, saying: "We have defiled our intellect by the creation of such scientific instruments of destruction that we are now in desperate danger of destroying

ourselves. We have succeeded only in aggravating our peril." We must, he said, seek peace through "reason." "Admittedly, the problem of peaceful accommodation in the world is infinitely more difficult than the conquest of space, infinitely more complex than a trip to the moon. But if we will only come to the realization that it must be worked out—whatever it may mean to such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty—I believe that we can somehow find a workable solution." To him "the central problem of our time" is discovering "how to employ human intelligence for the salvation of mankind." "How long—I would ask you—can we put off salvation? When does humanity run out?" . . . Citing Bradley, as well as Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Albert Schweitzer, and Pope Pius, to whose "admonitory voices" he said we have been deaf, Lewis Mumford, in a long letter to *The Washington Post and Times-Herald* 11 November 1957, underscored the suicidal nature

*With special thanks to *The New York Times*, *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, and *The Evening Star* (Washington, D. C.).

of an atomic arms race. He charged that both the United States and Russia have played down "the total danger to mankind's existence from an untrammelled exploitation of atomic energy before the necessary physical, biological, political and moral safeguards" have been provided. From the fact that "all countries are vulnerable to the misuse of nuclear fission" he reasoned that "therefore all countries, even our enemy's, must be protected. Here is the honorable basis for a rational reorientation of public policy. . . ." Other materials that have come to our notice as worth reading within this general context include Nevile Shute's book *On the Beach* (1957) and the following articles: Al Toffler's series on the airpower lobby ("Salesmen in Uniform" and "Who Will Make the Missiles?" *The Nation*, 20 November and 7 December 1957); C. Wright Mills's "Program for Peace" (*ibid.*, 7 December 1957); Walter Millis' "The Road to Nowhere" (*ibid.*, 14 December 1957); Ralph E. Lapp's series on "The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon," which began in the December 1957 issue of *Harper's Magazine*; Dorothy Thompson's "U. S. Defense Perimeter Policy—Acceptance of Plan, Held Dangerous and Foolish, Is Called Remarkable" (*The Evening Star* [Washington, D. C.], 4 January 1958); Raymond B. Fosdick's "Christmas Thoughts in 'a World Gone Mad'" ("Instead of being 'obsessed with armaments,' we should at last become aware that Peace on Earth, Good Will Toward Men is a formula for survival.") (*The New York Times Magazine*, 22 December 1957); and Hubert H. Humphrey's "What Hope for Disarmament?" ("It lies," says Senator Humphrey, "in recognition of past mistakes, better coordination of defense and disarmament policies, and a more decisive diplomacy." *Ibid.*, 5 January 1958.)

The Queen and the Revolution:

Queen Elizabeth II landed at an airport named after Patrick Henry when she arrived for the Jamestown Festival last October, but her escorts omitted a visit to the New World Pavilion where Henry's portrait dominates one wall with certain famous words about treason above it. Close scheduling enabled her to avoid a re-enactment of the British defeat at nearby Yorktown. In Williamsburg the Queen received from President Eisenhower 107 volumes of headquarters papers of the British Army in America in commemoration of the 350th anniversary of the settlement of Jamestown. These were a gift of Winthrop Rockefeller who recently acquired them from a private American collector who had purchased them from the British Government.

The Civil War: William A. Lundy, of Crestview, Florida, the youngest of the last three Confederate veterans, died on 1 September 1957 at the age of 109. . . . A three-day conference on the Civil War at Gettysburg College, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, last November brought together a number of scholars who expressed themselves on a variety of topics. Bruce Catton referred to the race problem as an "unfinished piece of business" left over from the Civil War and said it would be solved because it had to be, while Allan Nevins averred that Lincoln's plan to resettle (colonize) freed Negroes in Latin America was a bold plan that could have been made to work for hundreds of thousands of men and women, a view with which we disagreed several years ago in "Lincoln and the Chiriqui Colonization Project," *The Journal of Negro History*, October 1952. Frank E. Vandiver reminded his listeners that the states righters in the Confederacy about confounded Jefferson Davis, while C. Vann Woodward hoped that the forthcoming Civil War Centennial would "not conclude with a crisis reminiscent of the one celebrated." John Kenneth Galbraith, an economist in a den of historians, observed that the South's

investment in slaves was not destroyed but was transferred to the freedmen. A rapid rebuilding of devastated areas offset the devastation, as seen in the fact that cotton production 15 years after the war exceeded the prewar rate. At commemorative exercises John Hope Franklin read the Gettysburg Address and, it is said, thus became the first Negro to play that role in the annual ceremonies at the Battlefield. . . . The sixth meeting of the Washington [D. C.] History of Science Club, convening in the Theatre of the Folger Shakespeare Library on the evening of 10 December 1957, heard Nathan Reingold of the National Archives read an excellent paper on "Mobilizing Science in the Civil War." It dealt with the Navy's so-called "Permanent Commission," as well as with the founding of the National Academy of Sciences. On the same evening the Civil War Round Table of Washington nodded to the North (for a change), with Robert S. Hall's address on "Union Chaplains in Combat," which we were sorry to miss. . . . At Indiana University Kenneth P. Williams, both a mathematician and an historian (*Lincoln Finds a General*) was recently advanced to the University's highest rank, that of Distinguished Service Professor. . . . From Gettysburg last December the President announced the appointment of 10 historians and civic leaders to the Civil War Centennial Commission, which, under Congressional authorization, will prepare a program to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Civil War. Among those named were Bruce Catton, Avery O. Craven, Ulysses S. Grant III, John A. Krout, and Bell I. Wiley. Others, representing the House, the Senate, the Department of the Interior, and the Library of Congress, were to be named later. At an organizational meeting Representative William M. Tuck (D-Va.) nominated Gen. Grant for the chairmanship, saying he "is respected by people everywhere, both North

and South," a view with which the rest of the Commission agreed.

Ships and Water Routes: On 6 November 1957, the "Reina Mercedes," tied fast at the Naval Academy since 1912 and therefore said to be the "fastest ship in the Navy," was decommissioned in ceremonies at which the Spanish Ambassador was presented with the ship's bell "as a token of good will from the officers and men of the U. S. Navy." The "Reina Mercedes," it will be recalled, was a Spanish battle cruiser sunk at Santiago de Cuba in 1898, raised the next year, and commissioned in the U. S. Navy. We hope that the Spanish Ambassador did not get the wrong idea. . . . With the decommissioning of the "Wisconsin" in November 1957 the U. S. Navy was without a battleship for the first time since the battleship was introduced as a distinct type of craft a half century ago. A victim of both economy and the missile age, the days of the battleship have been numbered since Billy Mitchell, with no help from the admirals, proved it could be sunk by bombardment from the air. . . . In August 1957 it was announced that the Department of the Interior would support legislation to provide a suitable berth for the frigate "Constellation" at Ft. McHenry, provided the cost of restoring the vessel, now tied up in Baltimore Harbor, is financed without Federal funds. The "Constellation," launched in Baltimore in 1797, is slightly older than her sister ship, the "Constitution," now on display at the Boston Naval Shipyard. . . . The United States and Canadian search for a northwest passage, to provide an escape route for ships that supply distant early-warning sites strung along the upper fringe of North America, was rewarded with the announcement in August 1957 that the Canadian patrol ship "Labrador," preceded by the tiny sound boat "Pogo" and two helicopters, had made its way through Bellot Strait, which runs east and west between Boothia Penin-

sula and Somerset Island. Useful only in the summer, and then only with the support of icebreakers, this is hardly the commercial route that mariners have sought since the sixteenth century. . . . Students of naval strategy and diplomatic historians who have specialized in the history of the interoceanic routes of the American Isthmus could add another note to their voluminous files with the announcement in November 1957 that the House Merchant Marine Committee had appointed a special staff to study the question of whether to enlarge the Panama Canal (which in 1947 was recommended for conversion to a sea-level canal) or build a second canal in Central America, the Committee stating that the present canal was "approaching obsolescence." Among those named to the technical staff was Leslie R. Groves, who headed the Manhattan Project in World War II.

Air History: A new airfield at the Army Aviation Center, Ft. Rucker, Alabama, was dedicated in September 1957 in honor of Thaddeus Lowe, the famous Civil War balloonist, while last December ceremonies were held both in the Smithsonian Institution in Washington and at the Wright Brothers National Memorial, Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina, to honor Billy Mitchell and the Wright Brothers as part of the final observance of the 50th anniversary of the U. S. Air Force, first established in the Army Signal Corps in 1907. The ceremony at the Smithsonian was the dedication of a heroic statue of Mitchell in all his proud glory, while the ceremony in North Carolina marked Wilbur and Orville Wright's 1903 accomplishment in making the first successful power-driven airplane flight in history, as well as the beginning of an accelerated Department of the Interior development program at the Wright Memorial.

Old Guard: On 21 September 1957 the 3d Infantry Regiment (The Old Guard),

whose duties today include furnishing the guard for the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Arlington National Cemetery, celebrated its 173d birthday. The date chosen for the commemoration of its birthday was the 111th anniversary of its attack on Ft. Monterey in the Mexican War. The Good Neighbor Policy came later.

UN Flags at USNA: The 29th Division Association sought by a resolution, passed without a dissenting voice at its September 1957 convention, to have the U. S. Naval Academy remove United Nations flags from the Academy Museum. The flags in question were flown by the battleship "Missouri" during the Korean War and the destroyer "Putnam" while enforcing the UN truce in Palestine in 1948. Rear Admiral Smedberg, the Academy superintendent, refused to comply with what he mildly called a "ridiculous" resolution, but what we might call disheartening evidence of the inability of some men to recognize the glimmerings of a better world.

New British Army: Writing for the British Information Services, Maj. Gen. L. O. Lyne recently explained the plan to reduce the size of the British Army and, by 1961, "with a slightly increased regular intake," abolish National Service altogether: "The proposed manpower reduction over the next five years is made possible by a realistic reassessment of the real requirements of an atomic age, where all congestion must be avoided, where modern weapons give greatly increased fire power to small forces, and where the mobility of transport aircraft enables a central reserve to achieve what hitherto only widely scattered garrisons could ensure." General Lyne, however, said nothing about the most serious problem yet to arise in the reorganization of British forces: the merger of the Highland Light Infantry and the Royal Scots Fusiliers, which was protested in Glasgow last Septem-

ber by thousands of veterans marching to the accompaniment of ten bagpipe bands—in spite of the fact that they were threatened with disbandment if they refused to merge. The difficulty was whether the unified organization would wear Highland kilts or the trews (tartan trousers) of the Fusiliers.

Soviet War History: Unless Marshal Georgi K. Zhukov's disappearance from favor has altered plans, the Soviet Union will publish its first full-dress history of World War II. This, according to a Moscow announcement last September, will be a five-volume work, to be published by 1960, which will be supplemented by five volumes of war documents. It is to be a "scientific history" and will be prepared by a special commission of 23 high political, military, and editorial figures, some of whom were close associates of Marshal Zhukov during the war, or so it was reported. The research is to be performed in a special department for war history to be opened by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism in Moscow.

Technological Competition — Pre-Sputnik: A *Fortune* magazine news release on the London disarmament conference dated 30 July 1957 was entitled "Disarmament Talks Show U. S. Technological Competition too Much for U. S. S. R." As *Fortune's*

editor and military analyst, Charles J. V. Murphy, saw it during the summer's calm, "they want to slow down the arms race, at least for awhile, because the U. S. pace is too stiff for their existing technical resources to match."

History No Guide? In an able review article ("Leadership to Provide for the Common Defense," *Public Administration Review*, Autumn 1957), on Masland's and Radway's *Soldiers and Scholars*, Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*, and Ekirch's *The Civilian and the Military*, Col. G. A. Lincoln and Lt. Col. A. A. Jordan, Jr., present the view, citing Walter Millis as authority for it, that "since about 1950 the historical approach may have become of only secondary value for comprehending the present and future. . . ." This makes good chewing for military historians (and no doubt other historians as well) who are inclined to regard the spreading of historical study as a panacea for solving man's problems and curing his ills. Through the study of history we maintain links with the past and enrich our understanding of how we came to be what we are. If we can learn useful lessons for today and tomorrow (as we undoubtedly can), well and good, but let us not expect more from Clio than the Good Muse can deliver.

The President's Membership Drive Gaining

We are happy to report that there has been a splendid response from the membership to President T. N. Dupuy's recent appeal: "Every Member Get a Member." As promised in that appeal, the names of members who have responded will be prominently listed in forthcoming issues of *Military Affairs*.

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NEW ADDRESS OF THE AMI

The attention of members and subscribers is drawn to the new address of the AMI: Room 704, 511 - 11th Street, N. W., Washington 4, D. C. We wish to express our gratitude to the *Army-Navy-Air Force Register*, which has so generously provided us with a more adequate and centrally located office at the new address.

INFORMATION FOR AUTHORS

Type manuscripts on one side of 8½ x 11 inch bond paper. Leave ample margins and double-space throughout, *including* footnotes and quotations to be set in reduced type. Footnotes should be double-spaced on sheets separate from the text and placed after the last page of the article. In matters of style and footnote citations the latest edition of Kate L. Turabian, *A Manual for Writers . . .* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) is to be followed. For points not covered adequately therein the latest edition of *A Manual of Style* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press) should be consulted.

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¹December 1957 changes will be listed in the next issue, Vol. XXII, No. 1.